SOCIAL TEACHING THEOLOGY AFF:

Resolved: The United States state governments and District of Columbia will require employers pay a living wage, varying by region and indexed to inflation. I reserve the right to clarify and will defend the USFG or whole res to avoid T violations, but not grant topical CPs. **SIMON[[1]](#footnote-1):** Emotional scare tactics like these may prove effective for corporations and their lobbyists, but behind the deceptions are employees who suffer every day as a result of the restaurant industry’s exploitation. The time has come to give workers the dignity they deserve by paying them a living wage. Besides, it would be good for the economy. Contrary to industry spin, [research shows](http://www.nwlc.org/our-blog/raising-minimum-wage-good-economy" \t "_blank) that recent minimum-wage increases have not resulted in job losses, even during the recession. To the contrary, wage hikes [boost the economy](http://www.eoionline.org/blog/good-jobs-paying-a-living-wage-are-essential-for-economic-recovery-on-main-street/" \t "_blank), creating more jobs. Giving workers more spending power [increases demand](http://www.nwlc.org/our-blog/raising-minimum-wage-good-economy" \t "_blank) for goods and services, which stimulates the economy and the labor market overall. To boot, major companies, [Costco, for example, have proved](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/03/12/costco-profit_n_2859250.html" \t "_blank) that paying higher wages is compatible with business success. In other words, corporations like McDonald’s and Wendy’s may even sell a few more burgers and shakes — to their own workers.

I value morality. **First,** cognition is characterized by division between the possible and the actual. It is possible for a triangle to have a right angle. It is impossible for me to be a prime number. It is possible for me to own a cat that weighs as much as my watermelon. It is impossible for water to be comprised of CO2. The first two examples are formal, and can be grounded within the properties of mind. The second two are rendered possible and impossible based on their instantiated predicates. Coherence in possibility requires the being that coinstantiates all perfect predicates and exists outside of possibility. The ‘most real being’ jointly exhibits every perfection. **CHIGNELL** summarizes Kant[[2]](#footnote-2): A few preliminary remarks about these: First, note that Kant takes objects as well as sentences or propositions to be bearers of modal status. Thus (as we have seen) he formulates the first premise as “something is possible” (II: 78, 91, my emphasis). He also says that if the actual world had not contained “Julius Caesar”, for example, then that “hero” would still have been a “merely possible thing” (II: 72). I follow contemporary practice here and attach modal operators to sentences that refer to such objects. Second, the modal status that concerns us, Kant says, is “inner or so-called absolute and unconditional possibility and impossibility” of things – the status objects have “in themselves” and not in relation to other things, including their causes (cf. II: 78, 80, 157).20 Third, (1) is true whenever x substitutes for a really possible being that exemplifies some F. Kant remarks that the “consequence” from which he aims to deduce the existence of G[CB] is “the absolute possibility of all things in general ”, by which he presumably means the real possibility of each thing taken distributively (II: 157, my emphasis). So it is not the possibility of any particular object (e.g. Julius Caesar) with any particular predicate (e.g. crossing the Rubicon) that is at issue here; rather, all of the real possibilities are being invoked. That said, it is easier to formalize the proof by discussing a single, arbitrary real possibility, since what we are really after is a way to say that the possession of all F’s is materially grounded (thus note that x drops out by the time we get to (6)). Fourth, Kant did not have access to later developments in modal logic and semantics so it is difficult to say whether he would accept the axiom of S5 expressed in (2). His negative statement of the proof according to which “that whose annulment eradicates all possibility is absolutely necessary” (II: 83) certainly seems to presume something like (2). For if “all possibility” was not necessarily possible, then it could be grounded in the predicates of a contingent being. Kant’s refrain throughout, however, is that “all possibility” has to be grounded in a necessary being, and I think the best way to make sense of this is to ascribe to him the premise that what is possible is also necessarily possible. Further, though perhaps more controversially, the general idea modeled by S5 – that all possible worlds are mutually “accessible” in the Kripkean sense – is so intuitive that I think we can presumptively ascribe it to historical figures who do not articulate a preference.21 Fifth, and more significantly, we need to know how Kant thinks (1) can be established. He often characterizes the domain of real possibilia as the domain of “thinkable” (denklich, denkbar) things and says that the proof aims to find the material ground of “alles Denkliche” (II: 82). Impossibilia, on the other hand, are not even thinkable, since in them a predicate is simultaneously both posited and “canceled” (aufgehoben) – Kant’s example is a “quadrangular triangle” (II: 77). “Thinkability” thus appears to be put forward as an analysis of possibility. If this were correct, then the mere fact that one can think of some xhaving F would be sufficient to justify (1). That said, I think it would be a mistake – though not one that Kant adequately steers us away from – to take his considered position to be that something’s being really possible consists in its being thinkable or thought. He does say in one place that “if nothing exists, then nothing thinkable (denklich ) is given and one would contradict oneself in nevertheless pretending something to be possible” (II: 78; cf. II: 297). But the reason nothing would be possible in such a case is not that no one could think these possibilities. The reason is that there would be nothing there to think: “The material element” of real possibility, Kant remarks, “is itself something and can be thought”. In other words, it is because the material element is already “given” (gegeben) in logical space somehow that it can be thought of in the first place (II: 83). In support of this reading, note that Kant later makes it clear that thinkability is not even a reliable guide to real possibility, much less a ground or analysis of it. On the contrary, we can “think” (denken) some things that are not really possible, and some things can be absolutely really possible without our being able to think them (B xxivn, A 232 ff./B 284 ff.). This doctrine about the limitations of mere “thought” will play a crucial role later in the argument, but for now it suffices to show that, according to Kant, thinking of some being does not, all by itself, provide justification for believing that it is really possible.22 But how then to defend (1)? We could run an easy inference from our knowledge of the actuality of some beings to knowledge of their real possibility. But this would make no sense of Kant’s frequent invocation of non-actuals in this context, and it would also call into question the a priori status of the proof as a whole. Another alternative is to say that Kant finds (1) so uncontroversial that he thinks we should accept it a priori and without argument. But if this is right, then the proof will no longer be even in principle the “basis of a demonstration”, and, worse yet, Kant will have no account of how to rule out a scenario in which the actual world is a necessarily empty world – i.e., an empty world in a modal universe of empty worlds.23 In light of all of this, I think we have to conclude that although the proposition that our world is neither empty nor necessarily empty is hard to doubt (especially if we have already granted S5), it is equally hard to find a non-question-begging way to demonstrate it given Kant’s technical conception of “demonstration” and his austere conception of the a priori (remember, not even “my own existence” can be admitted as a premise (II: 91)). In the critical period, when Kant thinks the proof is the basis for “belief” (Glaube) rather than “knowledge” (Wissen), it will be easier for him plausibly to claim that (1) can be simply presumed. D.2. Grounding the Grounding Premise Let’s turn now to the central and most controversial premise of the proof: (4) [♦(∃x)(Fx) → (∃y)(GF(y))] Call this the ‘Grounding Premise’. It says that, necessarily, if it is really possible that something is F, then there is something that materially grounds the possession of F. The two things (i.e. x and y) might be identical, but often they will not be, since x might be a mere (non-actual) possibility. Thus, for example, the real possibility of Joe’s being a bachelor might be grounded in the actuality of Joe being a bachelor. But if Joe does not exist, or if he is somehow married from birth, then the real possibility in question would have to be grounded in the predicates of some other actual being. From a textual point of view, Kant’s commitment to the Grounding Premise is indisputable: “all possibility in sum and each possibility in particular presuppose (voraussetzen) something actual, be it one thing or many” (II: 79). Sometimes he formulates it negatively: “That through which all possibility is altogether canceled (aufgehoben) is absolutely impossible” or, in a passage cited earlier, “that whose annulment eradicates (vertilgt) all possibility is absolutely necessary” (II: 79, 83).24 Put the other way around: if there were no actual, material ground of all possibility, then nothing at all would be possible.25 So Kant is clearly committed to the Grounding Premise in (4). But how does he defend it? The notion of an explanatory requirement or “presupposition” (Voraussetzung) plays an important role here, and it, like the proof as a whole, has its roots in Leibniz’s philosophy. Leibniz claims in the Monadology that the “givenness” of a thing’s predicates is an explanatory condition of its being both possible and actual, whereas G[CB]’s decision to create the thing is a causal condition of its being actual. The first condition is prior to the second: the predicates of things must be “given” somehow in logical space in order for G[CB] to survey all possible combinations of them and actualize the world of individuals that is the best. Leibniz locates this givenness in the divine ideas: God is not only the source of existence, but also that of essences insofar as they are real, that is, the source of that which is real in possibility. This is because God’s understanding is the realm of eternal truths or that of the ideas on which they depend; without him there would be nothing real in possibles, and not only would nothing exist, but also nothing would be possible. (Monadology § 43)26 The early Kant goes along with Leibniz on some but not all of this. He agrees that the requirements on existence include having an explanatory ground (Grund, ratio) and having an actual cause (Ursache, causa), while the requirements on mere possibility are explanatory but not causal.27 Kant also agrees that the explanatory conditions on possibility come in two main varieties – “real” and “logical”. In OPB, he puts the point this way: “in every possibility there must be distinguished the thing which is thought and the agreement of that which is thought in it with the principle of contradiction” (II: 77, my emphases). In the next section, I consider Kant’s account of these in reverse order before turning to his crucial disagreement with Leibniz. D.3. Three Conditions on Real Possibility By “the agreement of that which is thought in it with the principle of contradiction”, Kant clearly means the formal consistency of the predicates of the thing. So the logical possibility of, say, a right-angled triangle is at least partially grounded in the fact that there is no way to generate a formal contradiction from the sentence ‘x is right-angled and x is a triangle’. The following is thus the main logical condition on possibility generally: Consistency: The predicates of a thing must be logically consistent with one another.28 But there is another essential ingredient of possibility mentioned in the passage just quoted – viz., “the thing which is thought”. With respect to a right-triangle, Kant gnomically identifies “the triangle as well as the right angle” as “the data or the material element in this possible thing” (II: 77). The idea here seems to be that the positive predicates being a triangle and being right-angled compose the “material” or “real” element of a really possible right triangle, and that they are somehow required as “data” that is given in order for the right triangle to be really possible (II: 78).29 More generally, Kant thinks that some of a thing’s predicates – the positive ones as opposed to disjunctive or negative ones – must have the kind of content which determines the thing one way rather than another: “every characteristic mark (Merkmal) which is to be found in [real things] is positive” (Optimism, II: 31). And thus the prior availability or “givenness” of such positive predicates is required if a concept is to have any real content at all, and if its object is to be logically possible. Kant says this most clearly in the Nova Dilucidatio: positive predicates must be “real” and “available for use by thought” in order for them to figure into “any concept you please of a thinkable thing” (I: 395 f.).30 This is a distinct condition on the possibility of things – a material rather than a formal condition: Content: The positive predicates of a thing must be given as data that possess real content. As mentioned earlier, Kant and Leibniz agree about this so far: if a thing is possible, then there cannot be logical inconsistencies in its concept, and it must possess positive predicates that are somehow given with real content.31 Leibniz of course holds that many of the positive predicates are simply given in the divine thoughts. But in OPB, Kant goes a significant step further: in reflecting on the difference between logical and real modality, he sees that things that satisfy the first two requirements may have logically consistent and content-laden predicates that still fail to be really harmonious with one another. The opposite of real harmony – “real repugnance” (Realrepugnanz) – is what “obtains anytime something, as a ground, obliterates the consequence of another in a genuine conflict (Entgegensetzung)” (II: 86). This notion is central to the entire proof, and so is worth discussing in some detail here. For Kant, real repugnance is a non-logical relation that holds between two or more positive predicates of a thing, and it comes in two varieties. One variety is predicate-canceling. It obtains when, for example, there are two opposed but equally powerful forces operating on a ship: one a wind blowing east, and one a current flowing west, say. Together they keep the ship from moving in either direction, and thus “each reciprocally cancels the effect of the other” (II: 175 f.). Still, the ship itself, together with these really repugnant predicates, is a really possible being. Many of the examples that Kant provides in OPB and the “Negative Magnitudes” essay of 1763 are of predicate-canceling real repugnance. But in a few places he suggests that there is another variety of real repugnance that is subject-canceling. In these cases, the manner in which two or more predicates are opposed results in a “canceling” not merely of their respective effects, but of the subject itself qua real possibility. By way of example, consider the “Negative Magnitudes” account of how things can go out of existence or “pass away” (vergehen). Kant asks us first to conceive of something, a, that already exists. One thing that might make a pass away, of course, is that its sustaining cause is removed. Thus a “flame’s ceasing to exist” is a result of the fact that its “cause goes missing, namely, the continued feeding of the fire” (II: 193 f.). But there is another mode of passing away which involves not the sudden absence of a cause, but rather a “cancellation” (Aufhebung) of the entire subject as a result of a real repugnance between two of its predicates: [F]or something positivewhich exists to be cancelled,it is just as necessary that there should be a true real ground as it is necessary that a true real ground should exist in order to bring it into existence when it does not already exist […]. Supposing that a is posited, then only a − a = 0. In other words, only insofar as an equal but opposed real ground is combined with the ground of a is it possible for a to be cancelled (kann a aufgehoben werden). (II: 190). More concretely put: suppose A is the concept of a, and that A contains the predicates being water, and being XYZ (where ‘XYZ’ refers, as usual, to some chemical compound other than H2O). Most philosophers will agree that these predicates are not logically opposed to one another. But they are really opposed when co-instantiated at a time; thus, in A they will “cancel out” not just one another but also the real possibility of a as a whole. In other words, any joint and simultaneous instantiation of these two predicates makes their bearer a really impossible being. Subject-canceling real repugnance almost always involves this sort of conflict between the nature of a thing and a predicate which is not metaphysically compatible with that nature. Thus Kant says in OPB that “the impenetrability of bodies, extension and the like, cannot be attributes of that which has understanding and will”. It’s not that being extended and having a mind are logically inconsistent: there is no way to generate a contradiction from their conjunction. Instead it’s that “these predicates can by no means co-exist together as determinations in a single subject (II: 85). The “can” in these sentences is the “can” of real modality; a subject that is both extended and has a mind is a real impossibility for the pre-critical Kant. Another example of subject-canceling real repugnance is found in Kant’s OPB discussion of a thing that is both the “Supreme Being” and yet has the positive property of emanating the universe, which entails (he says) a lack of understanding and will. Kant is probably thinking of Spinoza’s substance monism here, since this is how he typically (and controversially) describes the natura naturans. Such a substance is a real impossibility, Kant says, because a thing lacking the “realities” of understanding and will, no matter how otherwise impressive, “would nonetheless be far inferior to what one must think when one thinks of a God” (II: 89). Thus any subject that jointly instantiates the predicates being the Supreme Being and being the natura naturans is cancelled in virtue of the real repugnance between the two.32 These examples provide a sense of how the early Kant wants to go beyond Leibniz and add a new item to our list of the conditions on possibility. Kant claims that a real possiblity’s predicates must lack subjectcanceling real repugnance – or, put the other way around, Harmony: The predicates of a thing must be really harmonious with one another. Now that we have Consistency, Content, and Harmony before us, we can solidify our understanding of how they work together to underwrite the Grounding Premise by looking at a final example provided by Kant in OPB, one that is intended to be in “somewhat closer proximity to [...] common sense” than the others. The example is that of a really possible “fiery body.” The logical element of this body’s possibility, says Kant, is simply “the agreement of the predicate ‘fiery’ with the subject ‘body’ according to the law of non-contradiction” (II: 80). Grant for the sake of argument that there is this agreement: Consistency is satisfied. But what about the material element – what and where are the data that stand in this relation of consistency? According to Content, the positive predicates which constitute the concept (viz., being a body, being fiery) themselves must be given with real content in order for there to be something that stands in the relation of consistency. Furthermore, according to Harmony these positive predicates must be really harmonious – i.e. they must be such that they can be co-instantiated by a really possible thing.33 Perhaps Consistency and Content could be satisfied without supposing that the fundamental predicates in question have an actual instance. For, as Leibniz says, the divine mind eternally thinks these predicates – thereby ensuring (somehow) that they have positive content – and it also presumably thinks them together in a way that exhibits their logical consistency. But what can ground the putative truth that the Harmony condition is met by a possible fiery body? This, once again, is where actual exemplification seems to be required: the metaphysical harmony of two or more (non-intentional) predicates, Kant suggests, can only be explained or grounded by the non-intentional predicates of some actual being. But why? Kant would have been aware, of course, that a Leibnizean objector to his theory would “by no means find it necessary that a body or a fire or so forth must exist as the data for [the real possibility of a fiery body], for they are simply thinkable and that is enough”. But, says Kant, “I continue to ask: ‘Is then a body in itself possible?”’ The objector would say that it is. But in virtue of what – what is it that explains the possibility of bodies? The objector might attempt to answer this question by analyzing the complex predicate being a body in terms of more fundamental predicates like “extension, impenetrability, force, and who knows what else”. Likewise he might analyze the predicate being fiery into more fundamental predicates involving the power to burn flammables, the power to heat, etc. But at some point Kant thinks the analyses – and the objections – simply run out: “given that henceforth you cannot break the concept of extension up into simpler data in order to show that there is nothing self-contradictory in it [...] then the question will be whether space and extension are empty words, or whether they signify something”. Kant articulates this as a semantic thesis, but his main idea is that a sentence ascribing extension to something is meaningless (rather than truth-valued) unless ‘extension’ refers to some really possible predicate: “you must give me some account (Rechenschaft) of your right immediately to assume the concept of extension as a datum” (II: 80). So being extended, Kant asks us to suppose, is an unanalyzable, positive (and thus fundamental) predicate and yet if it is true that it can be ascribed to something possible, then this truth will be grounded in something actual. The same point holds for the predicate having the power to burn: assuming it is fundamental, the truth that it is possibly instantiated must be grounded, in accordance with the modal PSR, by something in actuality. But, crucially, the modal PSR also seems to demand an actual ground of the truth that these two predicates are capable of being jointly instantiated in one thing. In other words, the complex object a fiery body is only really possible if it satisfies Harmony as well as the other two conditions, and the truth that a fiery body does satisfy Harmony, just like any modal truth, requires a ground in actuality. Furthermore, claiming that these two predicates are thought together by God or anyone else is not going to be sufficient since, for Kant as for Leibniz, mere thought tracks logical rather than real possibility (more on this in what follows). Thus, unless the Leibnizean objector is willing to admit that each of the relevant predicates, as well as their combination, “denotes (bedeutet) nothing at all”, he will have to assume that they are predicates whose positive content is given in the actual world in a way that grounds their content and their harmony. And where could that content be located but in the nonintentional predicates of something actual? It is this very complex line of argument, then, that leads to the Grounding Premise in (4). Kant articulates it this way: “All possibility presupposes something actual in which and through which everything [possible] is given” (II: 83). Once again this echoes Leibniz: “For if there is reality in essences or possibles [...] this reality must be grounded in something existent and actual” (Monadology § 44). But now we can see why Kant’s argument pushes us beyond Leibniz and concludes that the positive predicates of a real possibility must be grounded both in terms of their content and in terms of their harmony. This is what I have been calling “material grounding” above – a possibility that is materially grounded satisfies both Content and Harmony. Again, for non-fundamental predicates, Kant clearly thinks that Content and Harmony can be demonstrably met by appeal to the content and harmony of the predicates into which they can be analyzed (II: 86 f.).34 But for fundamental predicates, given Kant’s account of the constraints on pure “thought”, it is hard to see how Harmony could be met by anything but the actual and joint instantiation of those very predicates. I should admit that it is not always clear in Kant’s early texts that he was aware of how crucial a role the Harmony condition plays in distinguishing his proof from Leibniz’s. He is very clear about this by the time of the critical period, and so the argument as I’ve explained it here may be something of a retroactive reconstruction. Still, there are precritical passages where the importance of Harmony seems to emerge. He even says something about it in the early discussion of his proof in the Nova Dilucidatio: Possibility is only definable in terms of there not being a repugnance (non repugnantia) between certain combined predicates; thus the concept of possibility is the product of a placing-together (collatione). But in every placing-together the things which are to be compared (conferenda) must be at hand (suppetant) for the placingtogether, and where nothing at all is given (datur) thereis no room for either placingtogether, or, corresponding to it, for the concept of possibility. (I: 395). The claim here, again, is that real possibility requires that there be positive content “available” or “given” for a thing’s predicates, and that the collation of these predicates – their being-placed-together in the concept of an individual thing – must not result in either logical contradiction or subject-canceling real repugnance. On the assumption that such a collation only occurs in the actual world, Kant is led to a conclusion very similar to that of the OPB proof as a whole: “This being the case, it follows that nothing can be conceived as possible unless whatever is real in every possible concept exists and indeed exists necessarily” (ibid.). If material harmony is also a real relation, as Kant thinks it is, then this passage provides an argument for the actual, harmonious co-exemplification of all fundamental predicates. D.4. On the very idea of a material ground In this section I propose to back away from the texts somewhat and reflect systematically on Kant’s claims that the harmonious content of a real possibility must be grounded in something actual, and that with respect to fundamental predicates this grounding has to go by way of exemplification rather than mere representation. Many philosophers nowadays agree that there are at least two different things we might be asking when we inquire into the possibility of a given object or state of affairs. When asking whether it is possible for there to be water which is not H2O, for instance, we might be asking whether this is possible in the “logical” sense. That is, we might be asking whether the proposition “Water is not H2O” can be shown to lead, together with the rules of standard logic, to a contradiction of the form “A is not-A”. There is a complicated discussion about names and essences in the background which must be set aside here, but the answer given by most philosophers in the post-Kripkean era is clearly No. There is no way to analyze this proposition into a contradiction simply on the basis of the meaning of the terms involved, and so water that is XYZ (where ‘XYZ’ refers to some chemical formula other than H2O) is logically possible.35 On the other hand, we might be asking whether water that is XYZ is possible in a metaphysical or “real” sense. And to this question most philosophers will also respond in the negative. Why so? That too is a complicated question which I cannot begin to answer in detail here. Often an appeal to something like “ideal positive conceivability” is brought in to save the day. It is because we cannot positively conceive of water that is XYZ that we take such a substance to be metaphysically impossible.36 For a rationalist, or for anyone who wants an explanation of facts about real possibility, this bald appeal to ideal positive conceivability is clearly inadequate. A rationalist will want to know what explains the facts about conceivability – i.e. what explains the fact that we cannot positively conceive of water that is XYZ. Kant’s initial answer, as we have already seen, is that the substance in question is inconceivable because the predicates being water and being XYZ are really repugnant in a subject canceling fashion: this particular combination of predicates fails to satisfy Harmony and so it cannot characterize a real possibility. The explanation will have to go further than this, of course, since Harmony itself involves a modal notion (the predicates “can” go together). But it’s worth pausing here to emphasize the crucial distinction between the epistemological question and the metaphysical one. The question is not how we can know whether, for example, a fiery body is really possible or not (the “ratio cognoscendi ” in scholastic terms); rather, the question is about how it is that a fiery body is really possible (the “ratio essendi ”).37 The appeal to positive conceivability may answer the first question, but it clearly will not answer the second. I noted earlier that many non-rationalist philosophers may be interested in explaining facts about really possible beings, even if they are not committed to explicability of all facts. Philosophy is presumably in the business of explaining complex and mysterious-seeming facts in terms of simpler and more familiar facts. And facts about really possible beings seem, at first face, to be excellent candidates for such a reduction. In what do these facts consist? If the predicates in our concepts of real possibilities have positive content, where does this content come from? If those predicates bear the relation of real harmony to one another, what explains that fact? If there are truth-makers for the necessary truths about metaphysical possibilities, what exactly are they? It is prima facie unattractive, I submit, for a metaphysician to leave all of this unexplained.38 Kant’s inviting suggestion is that the explanation or ground of these truths has to be located in facts about actuality. The predicates of a real possibility are either necessarily instantiated in a way that explains their harmony, or derivable from necessarily instantiated predicates in a way that explains their harmony.

**Second,** only the GCB can explain our epistemic operations and truth tracking reliability. We don’t have reason to trust our judgements, such as scientific ones, absent belief that we were made with rightly oriented cognitive faculties like memory, inference and perception. To have reason to trust beliefs you must trust your faculties. But if faculties are cobbled together by natural selection, you have no reason to think our faculties are reliable instruments of truth, only survival, something better served by heuristic fiction. Naturalistic evolution would not provide faculties to reach metaphysical moral truth. Anything but the AC collapsses to epistemic skep - only if GCBs purposes are good can we trust even a good argument.

**And,** given the GCB’s perfection they must be the source of moral truth. The GCB’s power would be limited by other normative states and their liberty would be compromised. Finally, the GCB’s transcendence makes them a more reliable epistemic source for grasping moral truth. We have equality and autonomy without subjugation since we are *only* the GCB’s property. **LOCKE**[[3]](#footnote-3)**:** CHAPTER. II. OF THE STATE OF NATURE. Sect. 4. TO understand political power right, and derive it from its original, we must consider, what state all [people] men are naturally in, and that is, a state of perfect freedom to order their actions, and dispose of their possessions and persons, as they think fit, within the bounds of the law of nature, without asking leave, or depending upon the will of any other man. A state also of equality, wherein all the power and jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having more than another; there being nothing more evident, than that creatures of the same species and rank, promiscuously born to all the same advantages of nature, and the use of the same faculties, should also be equal one amongst another without subordination or subjection, unless the lord and master of them all should, by any manifest declaration of his will, set one above another, and confer on him, by an evident and clear appointment, an undoubted right to dominion and sovereignty. Sect. 5. This equality of men by nature, the judicious Hooker looks upon as so evident in itself, and beyond all question, that he makes it the foundation of that obligation to mutual love amongst men, on which he builds the duties they owe one another, and from whence he derives the great maxims of justice and charity. His words are, The like natural inducement hath brought men to know that it is no less their duty, to love others than themselves; for seeing those things which are equal, must needs all have one measure; if I cannot but wish to receive good, even as much at every man's hands, as any man can wish unto his own soul, how should I look to have any part of my desire herein satisfied, unless myself be careful to satisfy the like desire, which is undoubtedly in other men, being of one and the same nature? To have any thing offered them repugnant to this desire, must needs in all respects grieve them as much as me; so that if I do harm, I must look to suffer, there being no reason that others should shew greater measure of love to me, than they have by me shewed unto them: my desire therefore to be loved of my equals in nature as much as possible may be, imposeth upon me a natural duty of bearing to them-ward fully the like affection; from which relation of equality between ourselves and them that are as ourselves, what several rules and canons natural reason hath drawn, for direction of life, no man is ignorant, Eccl. Pol. Lib. 1. Sect. 6. But [second] though this be a state of liberty, yet it is not a state of licence: though man [humans] in that state have an uncontroulable liberty to dispose of his person or possessions, yet he has not liberty to destroy himself, or so much as any creature in his possession, but where some nobler use than its bare preservation calls for it. The state of nature has a law of nature to govern it, which obliges every one: and reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind, who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions: for [people are] men being all the workmanship of one omnipotent, and infinitely wise maker; all the servants of one sovereign master, sent into the world by [its] order, and about [its] business; they are [its] property, whose workmanship they are, made to last during [its], not one another's pleasure: and being furnished with like faculties, sharing all in one community of nature, there cannot be supposed any such subordination among us, that may authorize us to destroy one another, as if we were [not] made for one another's uses, as the inferior ranks of creatures are for our's. Every one, as he is bound to preserve himself, and not to quit his station wilfully, so by the like reason, when his own preservation comes not in competition, ought he, as much as [s]he can, to preserve the rest of man [people], and may not, unless it be to do justice on an offender, take away, or impair the life, or what tends to the preservation of the life, the liberty, health, limb, or goods of another.

Ethics cannot be consequentialist – put away turns relying on solvency and effects:

1) Humans lack calculative capacities. Every extinction disad ever read provides Bayesian reason to doubt that the predictive calculus used by debaters is reliable. The GCB never miscalculated, given its epistemic perfection.

2) Perfection reorients moral calculus. The existence of a being of absolute normative importance means the moral wrong of our actions as a failed orientation to the GCB would absolutely outweigh. Simimarly, we could not have good policy if we only considered the effect on rocks.

3) The existence of GCBs perfect ends render attempts at util human reasoning non-normative. The capacity for eternal goods to follow from temporal wrongs render all consequentialist calculation impossible.

4) GCB being perfect provides a grounding for ethics that is not contingent. If util is true, then GCBs goodness is contingent on the consequences rather than the nature of the acts themselves. This makes GCBs perfection contingent on something outside the GCB which is incoherent.

5) GCB is free in possessing every perfection. But under util there is only one just act which is the creation of a maximally perfect world. This would thus bind the GCB, denying its freedom which creates a contradiction.

6) Individuality in creation suggests purposes set for every particular person by the GCB, which means no aggregation of purposes is permitted by us.

The GCB is neccessarily good therefore if good does not have variety internal to itself it is impossible for GCB to will anything or choose anything every choice is already made. GCB's choice preceded an another concept of the good; if that were not the case then the choice could not mean anyting becuase it is not a choice between options.

Material valuations of labor must be constrained by moral requirements:

**First,** the state acts as an indirect employer which constructs and orients market economies. It must regulate to respect the worth of labor. Anything else is theft; individuals must be able to sustain themselves and their pursue ends as given by the GCB. Given the practical necessity of labor to procure goods, consent to contract is not meaningful. **JOHN PAUL II:[[4]](#footnote-4)** The distinction between the direct and the indirect employer is seen to be very important when one considers both the way in which labour is actually organized and the possibility of the formation of just or unjust relationships in the field of labour. Since the direct employer is the person or institution with whom the worker enters directly into a work contract in accordance with definite conditions, we must understand as the indirect employer [is] many different factors, other than the direct employer, that exercise a determining influence on the shaping both of the work contract and, consequently, of just or unjust relationships in the field of human labour. 17. Direct and Indirect Employer The concept of indirect employer includes both persons and institutions of various kinds, and also collective labour contracts and the principles of conduct which are laid down by these persons and institutions and which determine the whole socioeconomic system or are its result. The concept of "indirect employer" thus refers to many different elements. The responsibility of the indirect employer differs from that of the direct employer-the term itself indicates that the responsibility is less direct-but it remains a true responsibility: [it] the indirect employer substantially determines one or other facet of the labour relationship, thus conditioning the conduct of the direct employer when the latter determines in concrete terms the actual work contract and labour relations. This is not to absolve the direct employer from his own responsibility, but only to draw attention to the whole network of influences that condition his conduct. When it is a question of establishing an ethically correct labour policy, all these influences must be kept in mind. A policy is correct when the objective rights of the worker are fully respected. The concept of indirect employer is applicable to every society, and in the first place to the State. For it is the State that must conduct a just labour policy. However, it is common knowledge that in the present system of economic relations in the world there are numerous links between individual States, links that find expression, for instance, in the import and export process, that is to say, in the mutual exchange of economic goods, whether raw materials, semimanufactured goods, or finished industrial products. These links also create mutual dependence, and as a result it would be difficult to speak, in the case of any State, even the economically most powerful, of complete self-sufficiency or autarky. Such a system of mutual dependence is in itself normal. However, it can easily become an occasion for various forms of exploitation or injustice and as a result influence the labour policy of individual States; and finally it can influence the individual worker, who is the proper subject of labour. For instance the highly industrialized countries, and even more the businesses that direct on a large scale the means of industrial production (the companies referred to as multinational or transnational), fix the highest possible prices for their products, while trying at the same time to fix the lowest possible prices for raw materials or semi-manufactured goods. This is one of the causes of an ever increasing disproportion between national incomes. The gap between most of the richest countries and the poorest ones is not diminishing or being stabilized but is increasing more and more, to the detriment, obviously, of the poor countries. Evidently this must have an effect on local labour policy and on the worker's situation in the economically disadvantaged societies. Finding himself in a system thus conditioned, the direct employer fixes working conditions below the objective requirements of the workers, especially if he himself wishes to obtain the highest possible profits from the business which he runs (or from the businesses which he runs, in the case of a situation of "socialized" ownership of the means of production). It is easy to see that this framework of forms of dependence linked with the concept of the indirect employer is enormously extensive and complicated. It is determined, in a sense, by all the elements that are decisive for economic life within a given society and state, but also by much wider links and forms of dependence. The attainment of the worker's rights cannot however be doomed to be merely a result of economic systems which on a larger or smaller scale are guided chiefly by the criterion of maximum profit. On the contrary, it is respect for the objective rights of the worker-every kind of worker: manual or intellectual, industrial or agricultural, etc.-that must constitute the adequate and fundamental criterion for shaping the whole economy, both on the level of the individual society and State and within the whole of the world economic policy and of the systems of international relationships that derive from it. Influence in this direction should be exercised by all the International Organizations whose concern it is, beginning with the United Nations Organization. It appears that the International Labour Organization and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and other bodies too have fresh contributions to offer on this point in particular. Within the individual States there are ministries or public departments and also various social institutions set up for this purpose. All of this effectively indicates the importance of the indirect employer-as has been said above-in achieving full respect for the worker's rights, since the rights of the human person are the key element in the whole of the social moral order.

**Second,** while objects have an economic price, labor has a value stemming from its close relation to human identity, what is your job is often the second question you ask someone after their name. The government must ensure no one’s labor is exploitation as that constitutes exploitation of identity. **PAUL (2):[[5]](#footnote-5)** For certain supporters of such ideas, work was understood and treated as a sort of "merchandise" that the worker-especially the industrial worker-sells to the employer, who at the same time is the possessor of the capital, that is to say, of all the working tools and means that make production possible. This way of looking at work was widespread especially in the first half of the nineteenth century. Since then, explicit expressions of this sort have almost disappeared, and have given way to more human ways of thinking about work and evaluating it. The interaction between the worker and the tools and means of production has given rise to the development of various forms of capitalism - parallel with various forms of collectivism - into which other socioeconomic elements have entered as a consequence of new concrete circumstances, of the activity of workers' associations and public autorities, and of the emergence of large transnational enterprises. Nevertheless, the danger of treating work as a special kind of "merchandise", or as an impersonal "force" needed for production (the expression "workforce" is in fact in common use) always exists, especially when the whole way of looking at the question of economics is marked by the premises of materialistic economism. A systematic opportunity for thinking and evaluating in this way, and in a certain sense a stimulus for doing so, is provided by the quickening process of the development of a onesidedly materialistic civilization, which gives prime importance to the objective dimension of work, while the subjective dimension-everything in direct or indirect relationship with the subject of work-remains on a secondary level. In all cases of this sort, in every social situation of this type, there is a confusion or even a reversal of the order laid down from the beginning by the words of the Book of Genesis: man is treated as an instrument of production12, whereas he-he alone, independently of the work he does-ought to be treated as the effective subject of work and its true maker and creator. Precisely this reversal of order, whatever the programme or name under which it occurs, should rightly be called "capitalism"-in the sense more fully explained below. Everybody knows that capitalism has a definite historical meaning as a system, an economic and social system, opposed to "socialism" or "communism". But in the light of the analysis of the fundamental reality of the whole economic process-first and foremost of the production structure that work is-it should be recognized that the error of early capitalism can be repeated wherever [a [person] is in a way treated on the same level as the whole complex of the material means of production, as an instrument and not in accordance with the true dignity of his work-that is to say, where [they are] not treated as subject and maker, and for this very reason as the true purpose of the whole process of production.

**Third,** given centrality of labor to improvement of society and vulnerability of employees the state has an obligation to maintain just remuneration for labor. Anything else involves fundamental disrespect the authority of GCB. **POPE LEO XIII[[6]](#footnote-6):** 33. There is another and deeper consideration which must not be lost sight of. As regards the State, the interests of all, whether high or low, are equal. The members of the working classes are citizens by nature and by the same right as the rich; they are real parts, living the life which makes up, through the family, the body of the commonwealth; and it need hardly be said that they are in every city very largely in the majority. It would be irrational to neglect one portion of the citizens and favor another, and therefore the public administration must duly and solicitously provide for the welfare and the comfort of the working classes; otherwise, that law of justice will be violated which ordains that each man shall have his due. To cite the wise words of St. Thomas Aquinas: "As the part and the whole are in a certain sense identical, so that which belongs to the whole in a sense belongs to the part."(27) Among the many and grave duties of rulers who would do their best for the people, the first and chief is to act with strict justice - with that justice which is called distributive - toward each and every class alike. 34. But although all citizens, without exception, can and ought to contribute to that common good in which individuals share so advantageously to themselves, yet it should not be supposed that all can contribute in the like way and to the same extent. No matter what changes may occur in forms of government, there will ever be differences and inequalities of condition in the State. Society cannot exist or be conceived of without them. Some there must be who devote themselves to the work of the commonwealth, who make the laws or administer justice, or whose advice and authority govern the nation in times of peace, and defend it in war. Such men clearly occupy the foremost place in the State, and should be held in highest estimation, for their work concerns most nearly and effectively the general interests of the community. Those who labor at a trade or calling do not promote the general welfare in such measure as this, but they benefit the nation, if less directly, in a most important manner. We have insisted, it is true, that, since the end of society is to make men better, the chief good that society can possess is virtue. Nevertheless, it is the business of a well-constituted body politic to see to the provision of those material and external helps "the use of which is necessary to virtuous action."(28) Now, for the provision of such commodities, the labor of the working class - the exercise of their skill, and the employment of their strength, in the cultivation of the land, and in the workshops of trade - is especially responsible and quite indispensable. Indeed, their co-operation is in this respect so important that it may be truly said that it is only by the labor of working men that States grow rich. Justice, therefore, demands that the interests of the working classes should be carefully watched over by the administration, so that they who contribute so largely to the advantage of the community may themselves share in the benefits which they create-that being housed, clothed, and bodily fit, they may find their life less hard and more endurable. It follows that whatever shall appear to prove conducive to the well-being of those who work should obtain favorable consideration. There is no fear that solicitude of this kind will be harmful to any interest; on the contrary, it will be to the advantage of all, for it cannot but be good for the commonwealth to shield from misery those on whom it so largely depends for the things that it needs. 35. We have said that the State must not absorb the individual or the family; both should be allowed free and untrammelled action so far as is consistent with the common good and the interest of others. Rulers should, nevertheless, anxiously safeguard the community and all its members; the community, because the conservation thereof is so emphatically the business of the supreme power, that the safety of the commonwealth is not only the first law, but it is a government's whole reason of existence; and the members, because both philosophy and the Gospel concur in laying down that the object of the government of the State should be, not the advantage of the ruler, but the benefit of those over whom he is placed. As the power to rule comes from God, and is, as it were, a participation in His, the highest of all sovereignties, it should be exercised as the power of God is exercised - with a fatherly solicitude which not only guides the whole, but reaches also individuals. 36. Whenever the general interest or any particular class suffers, or is threatened with harm, which can in no other way be met or prevented, the public authority must step in to deal with it. Now, it is to the interest of the community, as well as of the individual, that peace and good order should be maintained; that all things should be carried on in accordance with God's laws and those of nature; that the discipline of family life should be observed and that religion should be obeyed; that a high standard of morality should prevail, both in public and private life; that justice should be held sacred and that no one should injure another with impunity; that the members of the commonwealth should grow up to man's estate strong and robust, and capable, if need be, of guarding and defending their country. If by a strike of workers or concerted interruption of work there should be imminent danger of disturbance to the public peace; or if circumstances were such as that among the working class the ties of family life were relaxed; if religion were found to suffer through the workers not having time and opportunity afforded them to practice its duties; if in workshops and factories there were danger to morals through the mixing of the sexes or from other harmful occasions of evil; or if employers laid burdens upon their workmen which were unjust, or degraded them with conditions repugnant to their dignity as human beings; finally, if health were endangered by excessive labor, or by work unsuited to sex or age - in such cases, there can be no question but that, within certain limits, it would be right to invoke the aid and authority of the law. The limits must be determined by the nature of the occasion which calls for the law's interference - the principle being that the law must not undertake more, nor proceed further, than is required for the remedy of the evil or the removal of the mischief. 37. Rights must be religiously respected wherever they exist, and it is the duty of the public authority to prevent and to punish injury, and to protect every one in the possession of [their] own. Still, when there is question of defending the rights of individuals, the poor and badly off have a claim to special consideration. The richer class have many ways of shielding themselves, and stand less in need of help from the State; whereas the mass of the poor have no resources of their own to fall back upon, and must chiefly depend upon the assistance of the State. And it is for this reason that wage-earners, since they mostly belong in the mass of the needy, should be specially cared for and protected by the government.

The standard is consistency with the worth proper to labor. This framing affirms:

1. There is a natural rights claim to livelihood above human interaction. Every time you take preexisting value, you deprive other people. The earth is owned by everyone and resources proper to each, so the justification to property is that by possessing property I leave more for others; it is justified on the basis of improvement. If I have power as an employer and people get property from me, they have a right to those resources if they cannot reasonably survive on what I give. I have not been consistent with leaving more for others by cultivating what I have and lack the claim to the property. Without a living wage I deny other claims to basic resources.

2. The dignity of work reflects the dignity of individuals as created for good purposes by GCB. GCB in entering into relationship with persons has dignified humanity in a way that requires valuing their labour as a tool that accomplishes its purposes. **PCJP[[7]](#footnote-7):** 301. The rights of workers, like all other rights, are based on the nature of the human person and on his transcendent dignity. The Church's social Magisterium has seen fit to list some of these rights, in the hope that they will be recognized in juridical systems: the right to a just wage; [651] the right to rest; [652] the right “to a working environment and to manufacturing processes which are not harmful to the workers' physical health or to their moral integrity”; [653] the right that one's personality in the workplace should be safeguarded “without suffering any affront to one's conscience or personal dignity”; [654] the right to appropriate subsidies that are necessary for the subsistence of unemployed workers and their families; [655] the right to a pension and to insurance for old age, sickness, and in case of work-related accidents; [656] the right to social security connected with maternity; [657] the right to assemble and form associations.[658] These rights are often infringed, as is confirmed by the sad fact of workers who are underpaid and without protection or adequate representation. It often happens that work conditions for men, women and children, especially in developing countries, are so inhumane that they are an offence to their dignity and compromise their health. b. The right to fair remuneration and income distribution 302. Remuneration is the most important means for achieving justice in work relationships.[659] The “just wage is the legitimate fruit of work”.[660] They commit grave injustice who refuse to pay a just wage or who do not give it in due time and in proportion to the work done (cf. Lv 19:13; Dt 24:14-15; Jas 5:4). A salary is the instrument that permits the labourer to gain access to the goods of the earth. “Remuneration for labour is to be such that man may be furnished the means to cultivate worthily his own material, social, cultural, and spiritual life and that of his dependents, in view of the function and productiveness of each one, the conditions of the factory or workshop, and the common good”.[661] The simple agreement between employee and employer with regard to the amount of pay to be received is not sufficient for the agreed-upon salary to qualify as a “just wage”, because a just wage “must not be below the level of subsistence”[662] of the worker: natural justice precedes and is above the freedom of the contract.

3. The flourishing of workers must be a foremost end as only though labor that the rest of society can flourish. Respect for GCB and interrelation requires a living wage. **LEO (2)[[8]](#footnote-8):** 19. The great mistake made in regard to the matter now under consideration is to take up with the notion that class is naturally hostile to class, and that the wealthy and the working men are intended by nature to live in mutual conflict. So irrational and so false is this view that the direct contrary is the truth. Just as the symmetry of the human frame is the result of the suitable arrangement of the different parts of the body, so in a State is it ordained by nature that these two classes should dwell in harmony and agreement, so as to maintain the balance of the body politic. Each needs the other: capital cannot do without labor, nor labor without capital. Mutual agreement results in the beauty of good order, while perpetual conflict necessarily produces confusion and savage barbarity. Now, in preventing such strife as this, and in uprooting it, the efficacy of Christian institutions is marvellous and manifold. First of all, there is no intermediary more powerful than religion (whereof the Church is the interpreter and guardian) in drawing the rich and the working class together, by reminding each of its duties to the other, and especially of the obligations of justice. 20. Of these duties, the following bind the proletarian and the worker: fully and faithfully to perform the work which has been freely and equitably agreed upon; never to injure the property, nor to outrage the person, of an employer; never to resort to violence in defending their own cause, nor to engage in riot or disorder; and to have nothing to do with men of evil principles, who work upon the people with artful promises of great results, and excite foolish hopes which usually end in useless regrets and grievous loss. The following duties bind the wealthy owner and the employer: [do] not to look upon their work people as their bondsmen, but to respect in every [hu]man [their] dignity as a person ennobled by Christian character. They are reminded that, according to natural reason and Christian philosophy, working for gain is creditable, not shameful, to a man, since it enables him to earn an honorable livelihood; but to misuse men as though they were things in the pursuit of gain, or to value them solely for their physical powers - that is truly shameful and inhuman. Again justice demands that, in dealing with the working man, religion and the good of his soul must be kept in mind. Hence, the employer is bound to see that the worker has time for his religious duties; that he be not exposed to corrupting influences and dangerous occasions; and that he be not led away to neglect his home and family, or to squander his earnings. Furthermore, the employer must never tax his work people beyond their strength, or employ them in work unsuited to their sex and age. His great and principal duty is to give every one what is just. Doubtless, before deciding whether wages are fair, many things have to be considered; but wealthy owners and all masters of labor should be mindful of this - that to exercise pressure upon the indigent and the destitute for the sake of gain, and to gather one's profit out of the need of another, is condemned by all laws, human and divine. To defraud any one of wages that are his due is a great crime which cries to the avenging anger of Heaven. "Behold, the hire of the laborers... which by fraud has been kept back by you, crieth; and the cry of them hath entered into the ears of the Lord of Sabaoth."(6) Lastly, the rich must religiously refrain from cutting down the workmen's earnings, whether by force, by fraud, or by usurious dealing; and with all the greater reason because the laboring man is, as a rule, weak and unprotected, and because his slender means should in proportion to their scantiness be accounted sacred. Were these precepts carefully obeyed and followed out, would they not be sufficient of themselves to keep under all strife and all its causes?

4. Given that GCB is infinite and perfect, the ends to which it placed humanity must be infinite. Insofar as the labor contracts correspond to its nature, the only good that can accord to them is the flourishing of an individual who can further GCB’s purposes, anything else is providing mere finite human good. The movement from a minimum to a living wage is not an increase in money, it involves movement from payment that is finite to one according with the infinite ends of GCB.

UNDERVIEW:

1. The aff is not religious, but demonizing religion philosophy is implicit whiteness. **SULLIVAN[[9]](#footnote-9):** The shift from de jure to de facto white domination and privilege in the United States has meant that whiteness increasingly operates in hidden, covert ways. In the days of lynching and Jim Crow, for example, whiteness used to stomp around in big-booted strides of oppression. Nowadays it tends to tiptoe, but its soft pattering can be deceptive. 1 The fact that white privilege and domination are more difficult to detect does not mean that they have disappeared. Today white privilege often functions unconsciously and “invisibly” (at least to most white people) and is all the more effective and difficult to eliminate because of its hidden modes of operation. 2 Within the academic discipline of contemporary philosophy, whiteness also tends to function in unseen ways. As I will argue in this chapter, one of those ways is through contemporary philosophy’s secularity. Given that religion and spirituality often are important components of the lives of people of color, a philosophy that is hostile to religion tends to produce a chilly climate for them. That chilly climate helps ensure the ongoing whiteness of philosophy by implicitly discouraging people of color to enter and remain in the academic discipline of philosophy. This process is especially effective because it functions without explicit mention of the topic of race. Whether the discipline is friendly or hostile to religion would seem to have nothing to do with the whiteness of philosophy, and this this seeming lack of connection makes the whiteness of philosophy all the more powerful because it enables philosophy’s whiteness to perpetuate itself in hidden , invisible ways.

2. Supernatural loyalty is the best method to address seemingly insurmountable oppression. **CHESTERTON[[10]](#footnote-10):** I venture to say that what is bad in the candid friend is simply that he is not candid. He is keeping something back— his own gloomy pleasure in saying unpleasant things. He has a secret desire to hurt, not merely to help. This is certainly, I think, what makes a certain sort of anti-patriot irritating to healthy citizens. I do not speak (of course) of the anti-patriotism which only irritates feverish stockbrokers and gushing actresses; that is only patriotism speaking plainly. A man who says that no patriot should attack the Boer War until it is over is not worth answering intelligently; he is saying that no good son should warn his mother off a cliff until she has fallen over it. But there is an anti-patriot who honestly angers honest men, and the explanation of him is, I think, what I have suggested: he is the uncandid candid friend; the man who says, "I am sorry to say we are ruined," and is not sorry at all. And he may be said, without rhetoric, to be a traitor; for he is using that ugly knowledge which was allowed him to strengthen the army, to discourage people from joining it. Because he is allowed to be pessimistic as a military adviser he is being pessimistic as a recruiting sergeant. Just in the same way the pessimist (who is the cosmic anti-patriot) uses the freedom that life allows to her counsellors to lure away the people from her flag. Granted that he states only facts, it is still essential to know what are his emotions, what is his motive. It may be that twelve hundred men in Tottenham are down with smallpox; but we want to know whether this is stated by some great philosopher who wants to curse the gods, or only by some common clergyman who wants to help the men. The evil of the pessimist is, then, not that he chastises gods and men, but that [they] does not love what [they] chastises—[they] ha[ve] not this primary and supernatural loyalty to things. What is the evil of the man commonly called an optimist? Obviously, it is felt that the optimist, wishing to defend the honour of this world, will defend the indefensible. He is the jingo of the universe; he will say, "My cosmos, right or wrong." He will be less inclined to the reform of things; more inclined to a sort of front-bench official answer to all attacks, soothing every one with assurances. He will not wash the world, but whitewash the world. All this (which is true of a type of optimist) leads us to the one really interesting point of psychology, which could not be explained without it. We say there must be a primal loyalty to life: the only question is, shall it be a natural or a supernatural loyalty? If you like to put it so, shall it be a reasonable or an unreasonable loyalty? Now, the extraordinary thing is that the bad optimism (the whitewashing, the weak defence of everything) comes in with the reasonable optimism. Rational optimism leads to stagnation: it is irrational optimism that leads to reform. Let me explain by using once more the parallel of patriotism. The [person] who is most likely to ruin the place [they] loves is exactly the man who loves it with a reason. The [person] who will improve the place is the man who loves it without a reason. If a man loves some feature of Pimlico (which seems unlikely), he may find himself defending that feature against Pimlico itself. But if he simply loves Pimlico itself, he may lay it waste and turn it into the New Jerusalem. I do not deny that reform may be excessive; I only say that it is the mystic patriot who reforms. Mere jingo self-contentment is commonest among those who have some pedantic reason for their patriotism. The worst jingoes do not love England, but a theory of England. If we love England for being an empire, we may overrate the success with which we rule the Hindoos. But if we love it only for being a nation, we can face all events: for it would be a nation even if the Hindoos ruled us. Thus also only those will permit their patriotism to falsify history whose patriotism depends on history. A [person] who loves England for being English will not mind how she arose. But a man who loves England for being Anglo-Saxon may go against all facts for his fancy. He may end (like Carlyle and Freeman) by maintaining that the Norman Conquest was a Saxon Conquest. He may end in utter unreason—because he has a reason. A man who loves France for being military will palliate the army of 1870. But a man who loves France for being France will improve the army of 1870. This is exactly what the French have done, and France is a good instance of the working paradox. Nowhere else is patriotism more purely abstract and arbitrary; and nowhere else is reform more drastic and sweeping. The more transcendental is your patriotism, the more practical are your politics.

Oppression is best fought by reorienting our values around the transience of this world. **CHESTERTON (2)[[11]](#footnote-11):** In this way at least one could be both happy and indignant without degrading one's self to be either a pessimist or an optimist. On this system one could fight all the forces of existence without deserting the flag of existence. One could be at peace with the universe and yet be at war with the world. St. George could still fight the dragon, however big the monster bulked in the cosmos, though he were bigger than the mighty cities or bigger than the everlasting hills. If he were as big as the world he could yet be killed in the name of the world. St. George had not to consider any obvious odds or proportions in the scale of things, but only the original secret of their design. He can shake his sword at the dragon, even if it is everything; even if the empty heavens over his head are only the huge arch of its open jaws."

Imagine you were saint george and the dragon was racism - We need to be able to recognize how utterly pervaive oppression is; but if one were to really accept it was so utterly hopeless then one could not have any motive to fight it becuase it is everything there is – there is no other locus; so what you have to be able to say is there is smething before or beyond this world that allows you to both be honest about how utterly depraved it is without coming to the concusion taht depravity si either inevitable, or right and natural.

3. neg abuse o/w aff abuse – neg flexibility to adapt to every aff allows you to craft the perfect strategy while I have already made presumptions from the AC by the time of the 1ar. Means T is an RVI since it’s 100% nonreciprocal – neg has no T burden, key to fairess since equity is the basis of competitition.

4. Philosophy is good. **WOOD[[12]](#footnote-12):** There is no plausibility at all, for example, in the suggestion that such Kantian principles as human equality, rationalism, universalism, and cosmopolitanism are [not] in their content favorable to racism, sexism, or other forms of oppression, and such a thesis needs only to be stated explicitly to discredit itself. But this highly implausible thesis may be put forward by implication if it can be associated with the quite distinct but correct point that *even* a cosmopolitan and universalistic ethical theory, such as Kant’s, can be combined with racist or male-supremacist views in its application. It is also true that [these principles] egalitarianism, rationalism, universalism, and cosmopolitanism are especially liable to rhetorical abuse by those who advocate policies in direct violation of them, because subscribing to the correct principles at an abstract level is often enough a shabby ploy used to protect contrary policies from criticism. The thought that this point has any *philosophical* significance, however, rests on an error of abysmal proportions about philosophy and its relation to human practices. If someone thinks there is a philosophical theory of morality whose uncritical adoption and mechanical application would suffice to protect us from evil, then that person is looking for something that could never exist. The correct standard for an ethical theory is whether it gets things right at the level of basic principles and values, not whether it contains some magical property that protects us, in the application of the theory, from every perversion or abuse through the influence of tradition and prejudice or the infinite human ingenuity of rationalization. All theories are about equally subject to such abuse, and no theory is immune to it. In fact, if we [To] think that the adoption of a certain philosophical theory, or a certain set of religious dogmas, will protect us from all moral error, that way of thinking itself is extremely dangerous, quite irrespective of the content of the theory or dogma with which we associate it. That thought itself is actually responsible for a lot of the evil that people do.

Means that every ethical theory can be misused – but that isn’t a problem with ethical principles, that is a problem with us – also means we should reclaim the true function of these ethical concepts in places like debate to challenge the way they are misunderstood; our depravity is a reason we need them now more than ever.

extra evidence:

Work is necessary for pursuing any purpose in life, which means that people have a natural right to just compensation. **LEO XIII**[[13]](#footnote-13) 43. We now approach a subject of great importance, and one in respect of which, if extremes are to be avoided, rightnotions are absolutely necessary. Wages, as we are told, are regulated by free consent, and therefore the employer, when he pays what was agreed upon, has done his part and seemingly is not called upon to do anything beyond. The only way, it is said, in which injustice might occur would be if the master refused to pay the whole of the wages, or if the workman should not complete the work undertaken; in such cases the public authority should intervene, to see that each obtains his due, but not under any other circumstances. 44. To this kind of argument a fair-minded man will not easily or entirely assent; it is not complete, for there are important considerations which it leaves out of account altogether. To labor is to exert oneself for the sake of procuring what is necessary for the various purposes of life, and chief of all for self preservation. "In the sweat of thy face thou shalt eat bread."(33) Hence, a man's labor necessarily bears two notes or characters. First of all, it is personal, inasmuch as the force which acts is bound up with the personality and is the exclusive property of [them] who acts, and, further, was given to him for his advantage. Secondly, man's labor is necessary; for without the result of labor a [hu]man cannot live, and self-preservation is a law of nature, which it is wrong to disobey. Now, were we to consider labor merely in so far as it is personal, doubtless it would be within the workman's right to accept any rate of wages whatsoever; for in the same way as he is free to work or not, so is he free to accept a small wage or even none at all. But our conclusion must be very different if, together with the personal element in a man's work, we consider the fact that work is also necessary for him to live: these two aspects of his work are separable in thought, but not in reality. The preservation of life is the bounden duty of one and all, and to be wanting therein is a crime. It necessarily follows that each one has a natural right to procure what is required in order to live, and the poor can procure that in no other way than by what they can earn through their work.

Work must enable one to access resources proper to live. **JOHN PAUL[[14]](#footnote-14):** It should also be noted that the justice of a socioeconomic system and, in each case, its just functioning, deserve in the final analysis to be evaluated by the way in which man's work is properly remunerated in the system. Here we return once more to the first principle of the whole ethical and social order, namely, the principle of the common use of goods. In every system, regardless of the fundamental relationships within it between capital and labour, wages, that is to say remuneration for work, are still a practical means whereby the vast majority of people can have access to those goods which are intended for common use: both the goods of nature and manufactured goods. Both kinds of goods become accessible to the worker through the wage which he receives as remuneration for his work. Hence, in every case, a just wage is the concrete means of verifying the justice of the whole socioeconomic system and, in any case, of checking that it is functioning justly. It is not the only means of checking, but it is a particularly important one and, in a sense, the key means. This means of checking concerns above all the family. Just remuneration for the work of an adult who is responsible for a family means remuneration which will suffice for establishing and properly maintaining a family and for providing security for its future. Such remuneration can be given either through what is called a family wage-that is, a single salary given to the head of the family fot his work, sufficient for the needs of the family without the other spouse having to take up gainful employment outside the home-or through other social measures such as family allowances or grants to mothers devoting themselves exclusively to their families. These grants should correspond to the actual needs, that is, to the number of dependents for as long as they are not in a position to assume proper responsibility for their own lives.

cap K:

1. Certain dimensions of capitalism are unethical, but you do not fix the problem by getting rid of capitalism, but the problem of sin. Humans are exploitative. That is the move of religion tradition, you do not fix theses problems by tearing them down. You do so my reforming the system.

2. Some form of property rights need to be maintained. Mere public ownership of one’s labor is impermissible. It fails to recognize the individualized moral locus that follows from the personhood of God. This still treats one labor as not a dignified component but a cog within a collectivist machine, additionally we cannot conceive of ourselves except as creatures situated with a concept of property, to act assume the constancy of material ownership. **POPE LEO XIII[[15]](#footnote-15):**  4. To remedy these wrongs the socialists, working on the poor man's envy of the rich, are striving to do away with private property, and contend that individual possessions should become the common property of all, to be administered by the State or by municipal bodies. They hold that by thus transferring property from private individuals to the community, the present mischievous state of things will be set to rights, inasmuch as each citizen will then get his fair share of whatever there is to enjoy. But their contentions are so clearly powerless to end the controversy that were they carried into effect the working man himself would be among the first to suffer. They are, moreover, emphatically unjust, for they would rob the lawful possessor, distort the functions of the State, and create utter confusion in the community. 5. It is surely undeniable that, [first] when a [hu]man engages in remunerative labor, the impelling reason and motive of his work is to obtain property, and thereafter to hold it as his very own. If one man hires out to another his strength or skill, he does so for the purpose of receiving in return what is necessary for the satisfaction of his needs; [s]he therefore expressly intends to acquire a right full and real, not only to the remuneration, but also to the disposal of such remuneration, just as he pleases. Thus, if he lives sparingly, saves money, and, for greater security, invests his savings in land, the land, in such case, is only his wages under another form; and, consequently, a working man's little estate thus purchased should be as completely at his full disposal as are the wages he receives for his labor. But it is precisely in such power of disposal that ownership obtains, whether the property consist of land or chattels. Socialists, therefore, by endeavoring to transfer the possessions of individuals to the community at large, strike at the interests of every wage-earner, since they would deprive him of the liberty of disposing of his wages, and thereby of all hope and possibility of increasing his resources and of bettering his condition in life. 6. What is of far greater moment, however, is the fact that the remedy they propose is manifestly against justice. [second] For, every [hu]man has by nature the right to possess property as his own. This is one of the chief points of distinction between [hu]man[s] and the animal creation, for the brute has no power of self direction, but is governed by two main instincts, which keep his powers on the alert, impel him to develop them in a fitting manner, and stimulate and determine him to action without any power of choice. One of these instincts is self preservation, the other the propagation of the species. Both can attain their purpose by means of things which lie within range; beyond their verge the brute creation cannot go, for they are moved to action by their senses only, and in the special direction which these suggest. But with man it is wholly different. He possesses, on the one hand, the full perfection of the animal being, and hence enjoys at least as much as the rest of the animal kind, the fruition of things material. But animal nature, however perfect, is far from representing the human being in its completeness, and is in truth but humanity's humble handmaid, made to serve and to obey. It is the mind, or reason, which is the predominant element in us who are human creatures; it is this which renders a human being human, and distinguishes him essentially from the brute. And on this very account - that man alone among the animal creation is endowed with reason - it must be within [their] right to possess things not merely for temporary and momentary use, as other living things do, but to have and to hold them in stable and permanent possession; he must have not only things that perish in the use, but those also which, though they have been reduced into use, continue for further use in after time. 7. This becomes still more clearly evident if man's nature be considered a little more deeply. For man, fathoming by [their] faculty of reason matters without number, linking the future with the present, and being master of [their] own acts, guides [their] ways under the eternal law and the power of God, whose providence governs all things. Wherefore, it is in [their] power to exercise [their] choice not only as to matters that regard [their] present welfare, but also about those which he deems may be for his advantage in time yet to come. Hence, man not only should possess the fruits of the earth, but also the very soil, inasmuch as from the produce of the earth he has to lay by provision for the future. Man's needs do not die out, but forever recur; although satisfied today, they demand fresh supplies for tomorrow. Nature accordingly must have given to man a source that is stable and remaining always with him, from which he might look to draw continual supplies. And this stable condition of things he finds solely in the earth and its fruits. There is no need to bring in the State. [Third] [humans] precedes the State, and possesses, prior to the formation of any State, the right of providing for the substance of [their] body. 8. The fact that God has given the earth for the use and enjoyment of the whole human race can in no way be a bar to the owning of private property. For God has granted the earth to mankind in general, not in the sense that all without distinction can deal with it as they like, but rather that no part of it was assigned to anyone in particular, and that the limits of private possession have been left to be fixed by man's own industry, and by the laws of individual races. Moreover, the earth, even though apportioned among private owners, ceases not thereby to minister to the needs of all, inasmuch as there is not one who does not sustain[s] life from what the land produces. Those who do not possess the soil contribute their labor; hence, it may truly be said that all human subsistence is derived either from labor on one's own land, or from some toil, some calling, which is paid for either in the produce of the land itself, or in that which is exchanged for what the land brings forth. 9. Here, again, we have further proof that private ownership is in accordance with the law of nature. Truly, [fourth] that which is required for the preservation of life, and for life's well-being, is produced in great abundance from the soil, but not until man has brought it into cultivation and expended upon it his solicitude and skill. Now, when man thus turns the activity of his mind and the strength of his body toward procuring the fruits of nature, by such act he makes his own that portion of nature's field which he cultivates - that portion on which he leaves, as it were, the impress of his personality; and it cannot but be just that he should possess that portion as his very own, and have a right to hold it without any one being justified in violating that right. 10. So strong and convincing are these arguments that it seems amazing that some should now be setting up anew certain obsolete opinions in opposition to what is here laid down. They assert that it is right for private persons to have the use of the soil and its various fruits, but that it is unjust for any one to possess outright either the land on which he has built or the estate which he has brought under cultivation. But those who deny these rights do not perceive that they are defrauding [humans] of what [their] own labor has produced. For the soil which is tilled and cultivated with toil and skill utterly changes its condition; it was wild before, now it is fruitful; was barren, but now brings forth in abundance. That which has thus altered and improved the land becomes so truly part of itself as to be in great measure indistinguishable and inseparable from it. Is it just that the fruit of a [human’s] own sweat and labor should be possessed and enjoyed by any one else? As effects follow their cause, so is it just and right that the results of labor should belong to those who have bestowed their labor. 11. With reason, then, the common opinion of mankind, little affected by the few dissentients who have contended for the opposite view, has found in the careful study of nature, and in the laws of nature, the foundations of the division of property, and the practice of all ages has consecrated the principle of private ownership, as being pre-eminently in conformity with human nature, and as conducing in the most unmistakable manner to the peace and tranquillity of human existence. The same principle is confirmed and enforced by the civil laws-laws which, so long as they are just, derive from the law of nature their binding force. The authority of the divine law adds its sanction, forbidding us in severest terms even to covet that which is another's: "Thou shalt not covet thy neighbour's wife; nor his house, nor his field, nor his man-servant, nor his maid-servant, nor his ox, nor his ass, nor anything that is his."(2) 12. The rights here spoken of, belonging to each individual man, are seen in much stronger light when considered in relation to man's social and domestic obligations. In choosing a state of life, it is indisputable that all are at full liberty to follow the counsel of Jesus Christ as to observing virginity, or to bind themselves by the marriage tie. No human law can abolish the natural and original right of marriage, nor in any way limit the chief and principal purpose of marriage ordained by God's authority from the beginning: "Increase and multiply."(3) Hence we have the family, the "society" of a man's house - a society very small, one must admit, but none the less a true society, and one older than any State. Consequently, it has rights and duties peculiar to itself which are quite independent of the State. 13. That right to property, therefore, which has been proved to belong naturally to individual persons, must in like wise belong to a man in his capacity of head of a family; nay, that right is all the stronger in proportion as the human person receives a wider extension in the family group. It is a most sacred law of nature that a father should provide food and all necessaries for those whom he has begotten; and, similarly, it is natural that he should wish that his children, who carry on, so to speak, and continue his personality, should be by him provided with all that is needful to enable them to keep themselves decently from want and misery amid the uncertainties of this mortal life. Now, in no other way can a father effect this except by the ownership of productive property, which he can transmit to his children by inheritance. A family, no less than a State, is, as We have said, a true society, governed by an authority peculiar to itself, that is to say, by the authority of the father. Provided, therefore, the limits which are prescribed by the very purposes for which it exists be not transgressed, the family has at least equal rights with the State in the choice and pursuit of the things needful to its preservation and its just liberty. We say, "at least equal rights"; for, inasmuch as the domestic household is antecedent, as well in idea as in fact, to the gathering of men into a community, the family must necessarily have rights and duties which are prior to those of the community, and founded more immediately in nature. If the citizens, if the families on entering into association and fellowship, were to experience hindrance in a commonwealth instead of help, and were to find their rights attacked instead of being upheld, society would rightly be an object of detestation rather than of desire. 14. The contention, then, that the civil government should at its option intrude into and exercise intimate control over the family and the household is a great and pernicious error. True, if a family finds itself in exceeding distress, utterly deprived of the counsel of friends, and without any prospect of extricating itself, it is right that extreme necessity be met by public aid, since each family is a part of the commonwealth. In like manner, if within the precincts of the household there occur grave disturbance of mutual rights, public authority should intervene to force each party to yield to the other its proper due; for this is not to deprive citizens of their rights, but justly and properly to safeguard and strengthen them. But the rulers of the commonwealth must go no further; here, nature bids them stop. Paternal authority can be neither abolished nor absorbed by the State; for it has the same source as human life itself. "The child belongs to the father," and is, as it were, the continuation of the father's personality; and speaking strictly, the child takes its place in civil society, not of its own right, but in its quality as member of the family in which it is born. And for the very reason that "the child belongs to the father" it is, as St. Thomas Aquinas says, "before it attains the use of free will, under the power and the charge of its parents."(4) The socialists, therefore, in setting aside the parent and setting up a State supervision, act against natural justice, and destroy the structure of the home. 15. And in addition to injustice, it is only too evident what an upset and disturbance there would be in all classes, and to how intolerable and hateful a slavery citizens would be subjected. The door would be thrown open to envy, to mutual invective, and to discord; the sources of wealth themselves would run dry, for no one would have any interest in exerting his talents or his industry; and that ideal equality about which they entertain pleasant dreams would be in reality the levelling down of all to a like condition of misery and degradation. Hence, it is clear that the main tenet of socialism, community of goods, must be utterly rejected, since it only injures those whom it would seem meant to benefit, is directly contrary to the natural rights of mankind, and would introduce confusion and disorder into the commonweal. The first and most fundamental principle, therefore, if one would undertake to alleviate the condition of the masses, must be the inviolability of private property. This being established, we proceed to show where the remedy sought for must be found.

That’s the socialism preempts:

*First*, workers intend to acquire a right to dispose of their money as they see fit, which means socialism violates the interests of all wage earners.

*Second*, utility is extended over time. We cannot conceive of the use of something except via the idea that we possess extended use of it, but that idea is simply the idea that we have a property claim over it.

*Third*, private ownership is not inconsistent with the right to sustenance so long as people can cultivate goods and then exchange them with others.

*Fourth*, laboring generates a property rights claim so violating it is bad. That’s because robbing someone of those fruits is to deny the extension of their means and thus their own person since they cultivate new things. The only thing you can add to something un-owned is your labor; if an apple was yours when you ate it, it must have been yours when you acquired it.

concept of property in the AC:

Government constrain the partiality of people in following laws apart from the GCB’s since they cannot be judges in their own cases. The state must secure property since otherwise rights are uncertain. Property is created by mixing labor with that which does not cancel another claim. If I paint your house I don’t own the wall because it was not free for me to acquire. Prior to acquisition all is freely given by God. Rousseau explains legitimate property acquisition through mixing labor. **ROUSSEAU[[16]](#footnote-16):** The cultivation of the earth necessarily brought about its distribution; and property, once recognised, gave rise to the first rules of justice; for, to secure each man his [her] own, it had to be possible for each to have something. Besides, as [hu]men[s] began to look forward to the future, and all had something to lose, every one had reason to apprehend that reprisals would follow any injury he might do to another. This origin is so much the more natural, as it is impossible to conceive how property can come from anything but manual labour: for what else can a [hu]man add to things which [s]he does not originally create, so as to make them his [her] own property? It is the husband [person’s] man's labour alone that, giving him [her] a title to the produce of the ground [s]he has tilled, gives him [her] a claim also to the land itself, at least till harvest, and so, from year to year, a constant possession which is easily transformed into property. When the ancients, says Grotius, gave to Ceres the title of Legislatrix, and to a festival celebrated in her honour the name of Thesmophoria, they meant by that that the distribution of lands had produced a new kind of right: that is to say, the right of property, which is different from the right deducible from the law of nature.

When I farm, the crop is an extension of my labor, since I used the land as a platform to cultivate crops as NEW fruits of my labor. The notion of property is contingent on people contractually respecting claims to that property. People would respect claims to property you developed through labor since YOU alone are the producer, but we would never respect value that you did not create since every time you take control of preexisting value, you deprive other people of that value.

Property is justified by the usefulness of what is left. Anything you leave without using it for GCB’s purposes was stolen from humanity. **LOCKE[[17]](#footnote-17):** Sect. 37. This is certain, that in the beginning, before the desire of having more than man needed had altered the intrinsic value of things, which depends only on their usefulness to the life of man; or had agreed, that a little piece of yellow metal, which would keep without wasting or decay, should be worth a great piece of flesh, or a whole heap of corn; though men had a right to appropriate, by their labour, each one of himself, as much of the things of nature, as he could use: yet this could not be much, nor to the prejudice of others, where the same plenty was still left to those who would use the same industry. To which let me add, that [they] who appropriates land to himself by his labour, does not lessen, but increase the common stock of mankind: for the provisions serving to the support of human life, produced by one acre of inclosed and cultivated land, are (to speak much within compass) ten times more than those which are yielded by an acre of land of an equal richness lying waste in common. And therefore he that incloses land, and has a greater plenty of the conveniencies of life from ten acres, than he could have from an hundred left to nature, may truly be said to give ninety acres to mankind: for his labour now supplies him with provisions out of ten acres, which were but the product of an hundred lying in common. I have here rated the improved land very low, in making its product but as ten to one, when it is much nearer an hundred to one: for I ask, whether in the wild woods and uncultivated waste of America, left to nature, without any improvement, tillage or husbandry, a thousand acres yield the needy and wretched inhabitants as many conveniencies of life, as ten acres of equally fertile land do in Devonshire, where they are well cultivated? Before the appropriation of land, [s]he who gathered as much of the wild fruit, killed, caught, or tamed, as many of the beasts, as he could; he that so imployed his pains about any of the spontaneous products of nature, as any way to alter them from the state which nature put them in, by placing any of [her]his labour on them, did thereby acquire a propriety in them: but if they perished, in his possession, without their due use; if the fruits rotted, or the venison putrified, before he could spend it, [they] offended against the common law of nature, and was liable to be punished; [they] invaded his neighbour's share, for [they] had no right, farther than his use called for any of them, and they might serve to afford him conveniencies of life.

Thus when the state allows wasted money on the part of the rich, not used for justice, it violates the GCB’s purpose. **LOCKE[[18]](#footnote-18):** Sect. 31. It will perhaps be objected to this, that if gathering the acorns, or other fruits of the earth, &c. makes a right to them, then any one may engross as much as [s]he will. To which I answer, Not so. The same law of nature, that does by this means give us property, does also bound that property too. G[CB] has given us all things richly, 1 Tim. vi. 12. is the voice of reason confirmed by inspiration. But how far has he given it us? To enjoy. As much as any one can make use of to any advantage of life before it spoils, so much [they] may by his [they] [l]abor fix a property in: whatever is beyond this, is more than his [their] share, and belongs to others. Nothing was made by G[CB] for man to spoil or destroy. And thus, considering the plenty of natural provisions there was a long time in the world, and the few spenders; and to how small a part of that provision the industry of one man could extend itself, and engross it to the prejudice of others; especially keeping within the bounds, set by reason, of what might serve for his use; there could be then little room for quarrels or contentions about property so established.

Property warrants and preempt to tomato soup objections. **HULL**[[19]](#footnote-19): In particular, and in a way which Locke may or may not have spelled out coherently, proprietization seems to allow the benefits of labor to be fully realized, especially as that labor is applied to the earth itself. Such is the “chief matter of property … not the fruits of the earth and the beasts that subsist on it, but the earth itself, as that which takes in and carries with it all the rest” (II, 32). Having established that property in objects on the earth is the consequence of the admixture of labor with those objects, Locke argues that property in the earth itself is also granted by labor. Hence, “as much land as a man tills, plants, improves, cultivates, and can use the product of, so much is his property.” His justification for this claim amalgamates several lines of reasoning: He by his labor does, as it were, enclose it from the common …. God, when he gave the world in common to all mankind, commanded man also to labor, and the penury of his condition required it of him. God and his reason commanded him to subdue the earth, i.e., improve it for the benefit of life, and therein lay out something upon it that was his own, his labor (II, 32). Whether a property regime in land does in fact make better use of the resource is taken by Locke to be an empirical question with an overwhelmingly affirmative answer, as his repeated and increasingly extravagant comparisons to North American land use suggest. Indeed, this is a central feature of Locke’s narrative: against those who claim that property rights regimes damage the commons, Locke claims that proprietized labor in fact gives back to the commons, and results in an increase to it; hence, “he who appropriates land to himself by his labour, does not lessen but increase the common stock of mankind” (II, 37). In contemporary terms, property regimes have positive externalities, and Locke’s usage of the sufficiency and spoilage provisos are designed to ensure that those externalities are realized. Hence, not everyone will have land, but they will be left with “enough and as good.

Property generates a right to sustenance. **HULL**[[20]](#footnote-20): The proviso occurs early in the chapter on property. In answering the objection that if gathering confers a property right on that which is gathered, “one may engross as much as he will,” Locke claims that: The same law of nature that does by this means give us property does also bound that property, too. ‘God has given us all things richly’ (I Tim. 6.17), is the voice of reason confirmed by inspiration. But how far has he given it to us? To enjoy. As much as any one can make use of to any advantage of life before it spoils, so much may he by his labor fix a property in; whatever is beyond this is more than his share and belongs to others. Nothing was made by God for man to spoil or destroy (II, 31). The first thing to notice is that Locke thinks the spoilage proviso is a corollary of God’s initial grant of the world in common. Thus, the initial commons is “given to men for the support and comfort of their being;” in addition, God has given people “reason to make use of it to the best advantage of life and convenience” (II, 26). As many commentators have noted, this seems to entail a right of subsistence, and even an affirmative duty to provide such subsistence for those who cannot provide it for themselves. However, Locke’s claim is stronger than this: it is not just our obligation to subsist, but to thrive where possible: the earth is to be put to “best advantage,” (ibid), since people were given the world “for their benefit and the greatest conveniences of life they were capable to draw from it” (II, 34). In short, we are to strive for the optimal productive use of the resources given us. Property is then to be justified as a legitimate means to achieve the optimal use of resources. In particular, we might view the issue in contemporary terms as avoiding two opposing tragedies. One is a tragedy of the commons, where excessive use rights lead to resource depletion. The tragedy of the commons is thus a tragedy of non-productive overuse. Equally important from Locke’s point of view is the mirroring tragedy of the anti-commons, when granting too many individuals veto right over a resource results in holdouts and underdevelopment of the resource. Indeed, Locke’s entire discussion revolves precisely around such a veto right: if explicit consent were necessary to use a resource in the commons, per Filmer, then “if such a consent as that was necessary, Man had starved, notwithstanding the plenty God had given him” (II, 28).5

property rights nc interaction:

1. Non-normative backdrops argument takes out property rights since allowing a certain kind of exploitative system is defined as a deontological violation since it is a proactive enforcement of certain exploitative rules and practices – that’s John Paul.

2. We don’t have absolute property rights since they are given by the GCB, so they are only instrumentally valuable to the extent that they can fulfill the GCB’s purpose. I have only my bedroom to the extent that I accommodate my parents wishes and reside in their house. This means if I win a single piece of offense it takes out the logical structure of the NC.

levinas nc interaction:

1. If we think after the mental categories of the GCB to trust our mind – that’s the 2nd arg for GCB – then the GCB clearly taught us to link in categories. Means that totalization is so natural that it’s good and inevitable. I will always say this person is my coach and my judge and my team. We always totalize, you would never have any ability to do anything.

2. GCB is the only true Others because all humans are fundamentally similar to all humans. Humans can’t be Others because GCB knows us fully. I do what GCB tells me to do and GCB knows them *perfectly* so the only way we can treat people ethically is to follow GCB since it is the only one who could know someone without totalization, which means my framework is the internal link to fulfilling the neg.

AT law nc:

1. Law requires, first a method of interpretation and second an assurance of that method’s right application. However, the method of interpretation can only be answered by the aff as it provides an explanation of how right interpretation is promulgated by stipulating all humans think after the thoughts of the GCB and second natural law comes first, as the GCB witnesses directly to the human mind in his act of creation the capacities for such right interpretation.

2. The AC precludes, the conceptual force of human positive law depends on the legitimation of natural law. Aquinas[[21]](#footnote-21) I answer that, As Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 5) "that which is not just seems to be no law at all": wherefore the force of a law depends on the extent of its justice. Now in human affairs a thing is said to be just, from being right, according to the rule of reason. But the first rule of reason is the law of nature, as is clear from what has been stated above (91, 2, ad 2). Consequently every human law has just so much of the nature of law, as it is derived from the law of nature. But if in any point it deflects from the law of nature, it is no longer a law but a perversion of law.

3. Human law must be constrained by the genus of right reason as contextualized by the aff. Aquinas[[22]](#footnote-22) gives two warrants. I answer that, Law is a rule and measure of acts, whereby man is induced to act or is restrained from acting: for "lex" [law] is derived from "ligare" [to bind], because it binds one to act. Now t[T]he rule and measure of human acts is the reason, which is the first principle of human acts, as is evident from what has been stated above (Question [1], Article [1], ad 3); since it belongs to the reason to direct to the end, which is the first principle in all matters of action, according to the Philosopher (Phys. ii). Now that which is the principle in any genus, is the rule and measure of that genus: for instance, unity in the genus of numbers, and the first movement in the genus of movements. Consequently it follows that law is something pertaining to reason. Reply to Objection 1: Since law is a kind of rule and measure, it may be in something in two ways. First, as in that which measures and rules: and since this is proper to reason, it follows that, in this way, law is in the reason alone. Secondly, as in that which is measured and ruled. In this way, law is in all those things that are inclined to something by reason of some law: so that any inclination arising from a law, may be called a law, not essentially but by participation as it were. And thus the inclination of the members to concupiscence is called "the law of the members."

unemployment interaction:

1) Unemployment is not responsive – it’s a question of altering the relationship between workers and employer [that's PCJP]. I cannot enter into an unjust contract and not pay my workers enough in order to something else just – i.e. ensure more people maintain their jobs. This is the same reason it would be ridiculous to hire employees to steal from the rich and then donate the money. We cannot use an unjust contract for the purposes of a good end.

2) Renumeration is improtant; the argument is not about just helping people generically but about providing the correct renumeration for those who are working for you.

3) Cross apply Leo - if you work, then you need to be paid because your work promotes the goods of society and should share in that good, but it does not say that just generically people should be given good, but that they should share in those goods they produce through fair renumeration.

AT UBI work good:

Perm: do the aff for the employed and the CP for the unemployed.

Perm: do both – give everyone a living wage and a UBI regardless.

The NB is that work is valuable – the state should encourage a reciprocal working relationship:

1. The GCB worked to create the universe and then sustain natural and physical laws over time and since the GCB is perfect work must be good. Our labor is thus reflective and derivative from GCB’s great gift and to exploit it is to exploit GCB, which is a conceptual contradiction.

2. The GCB created us in conditions where we must work (it obviously could have made us without that need) and thus work must be part of the GCB's good purposes.

3. GCB is eternal and thus does not change but if it does not change then it can have no potentiality to do anything. So the GCB must be pure act and activity which means the concept of GCB is tied fundamentally to the concept of work.

AT UBI free riding bad:

GCB created us first and foremost equal. We are all equal property of GCB we cannot uniquely regard our own ends over anyone else’s without compromising God’s own interests. It forecloses on the ability to regard themselves the same way as yourself. **SIMMONS:**[[23]](#footnote-23) In its most general possible form, the principle of fair play asserts that those who benefit from the good-faith sacrifices of others, made in support of a mutually beneficial cooperative venture, have a moral obligation to do their parts as well (that is, to make reciprocal sacrifices) within the venture. The kind of unfairness condemned by the principle is that involved in taking advantage of or exploiting the sacrifices of persons who have freely assumed the burdens associated with maintaining mutually beneficial schemes. Typical instances of so-called “free riding” involve this sort of unfairness. But as these typical instances clearly show, such unfairness need not do any direct harm to the cooperative scheme at issue or reduce the benefits participants in that scheme can expect to receive. If I ride the bus without franking my ticket or cheat a little on my tax return, the effects of my alleged free-riding – on others or on the scheme providing the benefits – are likely to be negligible or nonexistent. Unfairly taking advantage of the cooperative sacrifices of others may do direct harm to them or their scheme, as when my grossly excessive use for lawn-watering of a small local water supply during a drought causes my neighbors to have insufficient drinking water. Or such unfair advantage-taking may do indirect harm, as when my influential example of noncooperation causes many others to defect from the scheme as well. But in many cases of unfair advantage-taking, the moral wrong done involves no harming at all, but only (what we can call) unfair “self-selection” – in which individuals select themselves for the privilege of doing the limited amount of free riding that the cooperative scheme can tolerate without harm. If all the drivers in Smallville freely cooperate to leave the breakdown lane on the local highway clear, it is unfair for Edgar to select himself as the one who will avoid the traffic by driving in that lane, even if it is true that the cooperative scheme in question can tolerate a limited amount of free riding before the benefits it provides (e.g., a safe place to deal with disabled vehicles, easy access for emergency vehicles) are threatened. Though Edgar is only, as it were, “taking up the slack” in an inefficient scheme, it seems plain that a real concern for fairness would dictate that any opportunities for nonharmful free riding themselves be fairly distributed to all participants in the scheme (e.g., each driver receives a pass entitling him to drive in the breakdown lane on a particular day of the year). Where (as in this case) no such fair distribution of opportunities is possible or practical, however, no participant is entitled to select him[them]self for those opportunities, since every participant has at least as much claim on the benefits of nonharmful free riding as any other, since honoring all such claims would undermine the scheme. Self-selection takes advantage of the good-faith sacrifices of others, by forcing them to bear alone the full cost of a mutually beneficial scheme. Notice that this unfairness does not amount solely to granting preferential treatment to oneself, since such preferential treatment is routinely morally permissible. The unfairness lies in the way that self-selection exploits or takes advantage of others’ good-faith sacrifices – an advantage-taking that occurs, I maintain only when one freely takes the benefits of cooperation with the requisite beliefs and preference structure, not when one merely unavoidably receives those benefits while going about one’s normally permissible business.

The CP encourages free riding since those who contribute to welfare are those who work and pay taxes by gaining upward mobility through jobs, but the beneficiaries utilize their means for their own purposes.

AT word k:

It seems like GCB uses whatever language at the time is common even if might consider it offensive. We could not access revelation unless it was compromised and dumbed down for our sake. So language can be properly used to simplify things even if it is imperfect as a result, which means the logic of the AC impact turns the K.

AT single group k:

According to any theistic tradition, everything is fallen and broken in relation to the GCBThere is a historical problem with everything, we should try to redeem them and use them property.

a) the fact that something did a lot of bad means it could do a lot of good. if a slug is a good or bad slug nothing much is affected. But a really bad human has the possibility of doing really good things.

b) the government cannot help but set wages, if the government actively sets wages, it is using LW, but if not they are doing the capitalist thing that has historically been used for injustice, so they are regulating not regulating wages that is bad. What is really good at this point?

AT no free will with god:

But any God would wish to grant us free will:

1) It would provide us space to grow and develop as persons. Parents encourage their children to do chores even though parents could do it in less time and or help the child do so.

2) God would not want to compel our action but that would require them to step back – otherwise we would feel coerced as if a policeman was always following us and you could not really be a lawful person because you felt coerced.

3) God created the world to work together and there is great aesthetic merit in letting it work out. If I built and designed a bridge I’d get a kick out of watching how it played out on a daily basis with people using and driving across the bridge. The true measure of a great accomplishment is that it is self-sufficient without my interference.

4) If everything is determined by God, there’s nothing different from God’s will in the world. Meaningful interaction with God presumes that we are separate beings – God would want to interact with us because he created us for one of two purposes – either God’s glory or ours – but either would require involvement in human affairs and getting something from the world.

5) If God embodies good and God is free, then freedom would be good. This implies that God would create good so God would create freedom in the world. If God promoted good, it would promote joy and emotion based on desert rather than determined emotions – but that requires free will. We intuitively value Mother Teresa’s happiness more than Hitler’s as she deserved it.

commodification bad:

Employers not valuing the worth of others is bad since:

a) commodification requires describing purposes one should fulfill but that requires knowing what someone is doing in the GCB’s plan which you cannot do; someone who seems worthless to you could be doing good from the GCB’s perspective

b) to commodify is to deny the fundamental equality of persons

c) GCB exists beyond all our purposes so commodification reverses value; our values exist because GCB made us as part of one of its purposes. To commodify is to use the ultimate end as a means to some subsidiary end

d) our worth comes not form our relation to other people but from the GCB and because it *needs* nothing material from us our worth lies fundamentally not in what we can get from others.

e) It assumes that we need to ultimately get things rather than relying ultimately on the eternal provision of the GCB. It’s the same problem as a child who work to the point of their own detriment because personal pride makes them unwilling to ask their parents for help

f) We are equal since the distance between the powerful and weak at the GCB is always infinite, which means no one can regard themselves as more important in an ultimate sense.

extra DCT warrants:

We understand the world within the context of greatest conceivable being. **KELLER**[[24]](#footnote-24)**:** The Mysterious Bang Those of a more rational mind-set have always been fascinated by the question, “[First] Why is there something rather than nothing?” This question has become even more interesting to people in the wake of the Big Bang theory. There’s evidence that the universe is expanding explosively and outwardly from a single point. Stephen Hawking wrote: “Almost everyone now believes that the universe, and time itself, had a beginning at the Big Bang.”2 Scientist Francis Collins puts this clue in layman’s language in his book The Language of God: We have this very solid conclusion that the universe had an origin, the Big Bang. Fifteen billion years ago, the universe began with an unimaginably bright flash of energy from an infinitesimally small point. That implies that before that, there was nothing. I can’t imagine how [could] nature, in this case the universe, could have created itself. And the very fact that the universe had a beginning implies that someone was able to begin it. And it seems to me that had to be outside of nature. Everything we know in this world is “contingent,” has a cause outside of itself. Therefore the universe, which is just a huge pile of such contingent entities, would itself have to be dependent on some cause outside of itself. Something had to make the Big Bang happen—but what? What could that be but something outside of nature, a supernatural, non-contingent being that exists from itself. Sam Harris, in his review of Francis Collins’s book, makes the classic objection to this line of reasoning. “In any case,” he writes, “even if we accepted that our universe simply had to be created by an intelligent being, this would not suggest that this being is the God of the Bible.”4 That is perfectly right. If we are looking at this as an argument proving the existence of a personal God, it doesn’t get us all the way there. However, if we are looking for a clue—a clue that there is something besides the natural world—it is very provocative for many people. The Cosmic Welcome Mat [Second] For organic life to exist, the fundamental regularities and constants of physics—the speed of light, the gravitational constant, the strength of the weak and strong nuclear forces—must all have values that together fall into an extremely narrow range. The probability of this perfect calibration happening by chance is so tiny as to be statistically negligible.5 Again, Collins puts it well: When you look from the perspective of a scientist at the universe, it looks as if it knew we were coming. There are 15 constants—the gravitational constant, various constants about the strong and weak nuclear force, etc.—that have precise values. If any one of those constants was off by even one part in a million, or in some cases, by one part in a million, the universe could not have actually come to the point where we see it. Matter would not have been able to coalesce there would have been no galaxy, stars, planets or people.6 Some have said that it is as if there were a large number of dials that all had to be tuned to within extremely narrow limits—and they were. It seems extremely unlikely that this would happen by chance. Stephen Hawking concludes: “The odds against a universe like ours emerging out of something like the Big Bang are enormous. I think there are clearly religious implications.” Elsewhere he says, “It would be very difficult to explain why the universe would have begun in just this way except as the act of a G[CB] who intended to create beings like us.”7 This has been called the “Fine-Tuning Argument” or the “Anthropic Principle,” namely that the universe was prepared for human beings. As an argument it must be a pretty powerful one, because there are a lot of fierce rebuttals being published about it. The most common rejoinder, which Richard Dawkins makes in his book The God Delusion, is that there may be trillions of universes. Given the enormous number of universes existing over enormous amounts of time and space, it is inevitable that some of them are fine-tuned to sustain our kind of life. The one we are in is one, so here we are.8 Again, as a “proof,” the Fine-Tuning Argument is rationally avoidable. Though there’s not a shred of proof that there are many universes, there’s also no way to prove that there aren’t. However, as a clue, this line of thinking has force. Alvin Planting gives this illustration. He imagines a man dealing himself twenty straight hands of four aces in the same game of poker. As his companions reach for their six-shooters the poker player says, “I know it looks suspicious! But what if there is an infinite succession of universes, so that for any possible distribution of poker hands, there is one universe in which this possibility is realized? We just happen to find ourselves in one where I always deal myself four aces without cheating!”9 This argument will have no effect on the other poker players. It is technically possible that the man just happened to deal himself twenty straight hands of four aces. Though you could not prove he had cheated, it would be unreasonable to conclude that he hadn’t. The philosopher John Leslie poses a similar illustration. He imagines a [hu]man who is sentenced to be executed by a firing squad consisting of fifty expert marksmen.10 They all fire from six feet away and not one bullet hits him. Since it is possible that even expert marksmen could miss from close range it is technically possible that all fifty just happened to miss at the same moment. Though you could not prove they had conspired to miss, it would be unreasonable to [conclude] draw the conclusion that they hadn’t. It is technically possible that we just happened to be in the one universe in which organic life occurred. Though you could not prove that the fine-tuning of the universe was due to some sort of design, it would be unreasonable to draw the conclusion that it wasn’t. Although organic life could have just happened without a Creator, does it make sense to live as if that infinitely remote chance is true? The Regularity of Nature [Third] There is something about nature that is much more striking and inexplicable than its design. All scientific, inductive reasoning is based on the assum[es]ption of the regularity (the “laws”) of nature that water will boil tomorrow under the identical conditions of today. The method of induction requires generalizing from observed cases to all cases of the same kind. Without inductive reasoning we couldn’t learn from experience, we couldn’t use language [or], we couldn’t rely on our memories. Most people find that normal and untroubling. But not philosophers! David Hume and Bertrand Russell, as good secular men, were troubled by the fact that we haven’t got the slightest idea of why nature-regularity is happening now, and moreover we haven’t the slightest rational justification for assuming it will continue tomorrow. If someone would say, “Well the future has always been like the past in the past,” Hume and Russell reply that [but] you are assuming the very thing you are trying to establish. To put it another way, science cannot prove the continued regularity of nature, it can only take it on faith. There have been many scholars in the last decades who have argued that modern science arose in its most sustained form out of Christian civilization because of its belief in a all-powerful personal God who created and sustains an orderly universe.11 As a proof for the existence of God, the regularity of nature is escapable. You can always say, “We don’t know why things are as they are.” As a clue for God, however, it is helpful.

Reason must be inspired by the GCB. Science is problematic absent a GCB framework – reasons for beliefs is grounded in cognitive faculties like memory, inference and perception. To have reason to trust beliefs you must trust your faculties. But if faculties are cobbled together by natural selection, you have no reason to think our faculties are reliable instruments of truth, only survival, something better served by heuristic fiction. Naturalistic evolution would not provide faculties to reach metaphysical moral truth. Only the GCB solves – faculties must have been created with truth conduciveness since we were created via the GCB to think after its transcendent mental categories. Anything but the AC refutes itself by collapsing to epistemic skep. Only if the GCB’s purposes are good can we trust even a good argument.

If the GCB can exist it must given proper predicates. **PLANTINGA**[[25]](#footnote-25)**:** 8. The Argument Triumphant [51] Using this idea we can restate this last version of the ontological argument in such a way that it no longer matters whether there are any merely possible beings that do not exist. Instead of speaking of the possible being that has, in some world or other, a maximal degree of greatness, we may speak of the property of being maximally great or maximal greatness. The premise corresponding to (25) then says simply that maximal greatness is possibly instantiated, i.e., that (29) There is a possible world [with] in which maximal greatness is instantiated. [52] And the analogues of (27) and (28) spell out what is involved in maximal greatness: (30) Necessarily, a being is maximally great only if it has maximal excellence in every world and (31) [thus] Necessarily, a being has maximal excellence in every world only if it has omniscience, omnipotence, and moral perfection in every world. [53] Notice that (30) and (31) do not imply that there are possible but nonexistent beings -- any more than does, for example, (32) Necessarily, a thing is a unicorn only if it has one horn. [54] But if (29) is true, then there is a possible world W such that if it had been actual, then there would have existed [such] a being that was omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect; this being, furthermore, would have had these qualities in every possible world. So it follows that if W had been actual, it would have been impossible that there be no such being. That is, if W had been actual, (33) There is no omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect being would have been an impossible proposition. But if a proposition is impossible in at least one possible world, then it is impossible in every possible world; what is impossible does not vary from world to world. Accordingly (33) the statement ‘there is no omnipotent, omniscient and morally perfect being’ is impossible in the actual world, i.e., impossible simpliciter. But if it is impossible that there be no such being, then there actually exists a being that is omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect; this being, furthermore, has these qualities essentially and exists in every possible world.

The ontological argument proves the GCB. **OPPY[[26]](#footnote-26):**. **[**Suppose that] G[CB] exists in understanding but not reality. (Assumption for *reductio*) 2. Existence in reality is greater than existence in the understanding alone. (Premise)3. A being having all of G[CB]'s properties plus existence in reality can be conceived. (Premise) 4. [Thus] a being having all of G[CB]'s properties plus existence in reality is greater than G[CB]. (From (1) and (2).) 5. [Thus] a being greater than G[CB] can be conceived. (From (3) and (4).) 6. It is false that a being greater than G[CB] can[not] be conceived. (From definition of “God”.) 7. Hence, it is false that G[CB] [cannot] exists in the understanding but not reality. (From (1), (5), (6).)8. G[CB] exists in the understanding. (Premise, to which even the Fool agrees.) 9. Hence G[CB] exists in reality. (From (7), (8).)

New form of argument of first cause:

My muscles must move, so the molecules in them must respond to certain electical pushes.

Which requires a certain atomic structure, which is sustained by certain subatomic properties, which is in term sustained by the property of certain quarks. But this cannot keep going forever so at some point each thing must have some basic physical propery that transmit energy and existence to the higher order levels. But the first cause argument could equally prove that must be God.

Naturalistic as opposed to a theistic understandings of human obligation undermines belief in its own reasonability. **PLANTINGA[[27]](#footnote-27):** In this chapter I’ll take this line of thought further. I’ll argue that despite the superficial concord between naturalism and science—despite all the claims to the effect that science implies, or requires, or supports, or confirms, or comports well with naturalism—the fact is science and naturalism don’t fit together at all well. The fact is there is deep unease, deep discord, deep conflict between naturalism and science. I’ll argue that there is a deep and irremediable conflict between naturalism and evolution—and hence between naturalism and science.4 My quarrel is certainly not with the scientific theory of evolution. Nor is it an argument for the conclusion that unguided evolution could not produce creatures with reliable belief-producing faculties; I very much doubt that it could, but that it couldn’t is neither a premise nor the conclusion of my argument.5 Still further, my argument will not be for the conclusion that naturalism is false, although of course I believe that it is. What I will argue is that naturalism is in conflict with evolution, a main pillar of contemporary science. And the conflict in question is not that they can’t both be true (the conflict is not that there is a contradiction between them); it is rather that one can’t sensibly accept them both. By way of analogy: I can’t sensibly believe that there aren’t any beliefs, or that no one has true beliefs, or that my beliefs are all false. These things are all possible, but I can’t sensibly believe them. In the same way, I mean to argue that one can’t sensibly believe both naturalism and the scientific theory of evolution. If my argument is cogent, it follows that there is deep and serious conflict between naturalism and evolution, and hence deep conflict between naturalism and science. Now it is not clear that naturalism, as it stands, is a religion; there is enough vagueness around the edges of the concept of religion for it to be unclear whether naturalism does or doesn’t belong there. But naturalism does serve one of the main functions of a religion: it offers a master narrative, it answers deep and important human questions. Immanuel Kant identified three great human questions: Is there such a person as God? Do we human beings have significant freedom? And can we human beings expect life after death? Naturalism gives answers to these questions: there is no God, there is no immortality, and the case for genuine freedom is at best dicey. Naturalism tells us what reality is ultimately like, where we fit into the universe, how we are related to other creatures, and how it happens that we came to be. Naturalism is therefore in competition with the great theistic religions: even if it is not itself a religion, it plays one of the main roles of a religion. Suppose we call it a “quasi-religion.” I’ve already argued that there is no conflict between theistic religion and science; if my argument in this chapter is right, however, there is profound conflict between science and a quasi-religion, namely naturalism. So the real conflict lies not between science and Christian belief (or more generally theistic religion), but between science and naturalism. If we want to focus on the fact that naturalism is a quasi-religion, the truth is that there is a science-religion conflict, all right, but it is between science and naturalism, not science and theistic religion. III THE ARGUMENT My argument will center on our cognitive faculties [include]: those faculties, or powers, or processes that produce beliefs or knowledge in us. Among these faculties is memory, whereby we know something of our past. There is also perception, whereby we know something about our physical environment—for the most part our immediate environment, but also something about distant objects such as the sun, the moon, and stars. Another is what is often called “a priori intuition,” by virtue of which we know truths of elementary arithmetic and logic. By way of a priori intuition we also perceive deductive connections among propositions; we can see which propositions logically follow from which other propositions. In this way, starting from a few elementary axioms, we can explore the great edifices of contemporary logic and mathematics. There are still other cognitive faculties: Thomas Reid spoke of sympathy, which enables us to know the thoughts and feelings of other people, introspection (reflection), whereby we know about our own mental life, testimony whereby we can learn from others, and induction, whereby we can learn from experience. Many would add that there is a moral sense, whereby we know right from wrong; and believers in God may add that there is also John Calvin’s sensus divinitatis or Thomas Aquinas’s “natural but confused knowledge of God” whereby we know something of God.6 These faculties or powers work together in complex and variegated ways to produce a vast battery of beliefs and knowledge, ranging from the simplest everyday beliefs—it’s hot in here, I have a pain in my right knee—to less quotidian beliefs such as those to be found in philosophy, theology, history, and the far reaches of science. In science, clearly enough, many of these faculties work together—perception, memory, testimony, sympathy, induction, a priori intuition are all typically involved. There is also the whole process of theory building, which may or may not be reducible to the previous abilities. My argument will concern the reliability of these cognitive faculties. My memory, for example, is reliable only if it produces mostly true beliefs—if, that is, most of my memorial beliefs are true. What proportion of my memorial beliefs must be true for my memory to be reliable? Of course there is no precise answer; but presumably it would be greater than, say, two-thirds. We can speak of the reliability of a particular faculty—memory, for example—but also of the reliability of the whole battery of our cognitive faculties. And indeed we ordinarily think our faculties are reliable, at any rate when they are functioning properly, when there is no cognitive malfunction or disorder or dysfunction. (If I get drunk and suffer from delirium tremens, my perception will be impaired and all bets are off with respect to its reliability.) We also think they are more reliable under some circumstances than others. Visual perception of middle-sized objects (medium-sized dry goods, as J. L. Austin called them) close at hand is more reliable than perception of very small objects, or middle-sized objects at some distance (a mountain goat from six hundred yards, for example). Beliefs about where I was yesterday are ordinarily more likely to be true than the latest high-powered scientific theories. Now the natural thing to think, from the perspective of theism, is that our faculties are indeed for the most part reliable, at least over a large part of their range of operations. According to theistic religion (see chapter 9), God has created us in his image; an important part of this image consists in our resembling God in that like him, we can have knowledge. In chapter 9 we saw that Thomas Aquinas put it as follows: “Since human beings are said to be in the image of God in virtue of their having a nature that includes an intellect, such a nature is most in the image of God in virtue of being most able to imitate God.”7 When Thomas speaks of our nature as including an intellect, he clearly means to endorse the thought that our cognitive faculties are for the most part reliable. But suppose you are a naturalist: you think that there is no such person as God, and that we and our cognitive faculties have been cobbled together by natural selection. Can you then sensibly think that our cognitive faculties are for the most part reliable? I say you can’t. The basic idea of my argument could be put (a bit crudely) as follows. First, the probability of our cognitive faculties being reliable, given naturalism and evolution, is low. (To put it a bit inaccurately but suggestively, if naturalism and evolution were both true, our cognitive faculties would very likely not be reliable.) But then according to the second premise of my argument, if I believe both naturalism and evolution, I have a defeater for my intuitive assumption that my cognitive faculties are reliable. If I have a defeater for that belief, however, then I have a defeater for any belief I take to be produced by my cognitive faculties. That means that I have a defeater for my belief that naturalism and evolution are true. So my belief that naturalism and evolution are true gives me a defeater for that very belief; that belief shoots itself in the foot and is self-referentially incoherent; therefore I cannot rationally accept it. And if one can’t accept both naturalism and evolution, that pillar of current science, then there is serious conflict between naturalism and science. So much for an initial and rough statement of the argument; now we must proceed to develop it more carefully. The first premise, as I say, is something like the worry or doubt that our cognitive faculties would not be reliable if both naturalism and evolution (or perhaps just naturalism) were true. This worry has some eminent advocates. For example, there is Friederich Nietzsche. Ordinarily what Nietzsche says inspires little confidence, but in the following he may be on to something: It is unfair to Descartes to call his appeal to God’s credibility frivolous. Indeed, only if we assume a God who is morally our like can “truth” and the search for truth be at all something meaningful and promising of success. This God left aside, the question is permitted whether being deceived is not one of the conditions of life.8 To leap to the present, there is the philosopher Thomas Nagel, himself no friend of theism: “If we came to believe that our capacity for objective theory [true beliefs, e.g.] were the product of natural selection, that would warrant serious skepticism about its results.”9 According to another philosopher, Barry Stroud (again, no friend of theism), “There is an embarrassing absurdity in [naturalism] that is revealed as soon as the naturalist reflects and acknowledges that he believes his naturalistic theory of the world…. I mean he cannot say it and consistently regard it as true.”10 As Patricia Churchland, an eminent naturalistic philosopher, puts it in a justly famous passage: Boiled down to essentials, a nervous system enables the organism to succeed in the four F’s: feeding, fleeing, fighting and reproducing. The principle chore of nervous systems is to get the body parts where they should be in order that the organism may survive….. Improvements in sensorimotor control confer an evolutionary advantage: a fancier style of representing is advantageous so long as it is geared to the organism’s way of life and enhances the organism’s chances of survival. Truth, whatever that is, definitely takes the hindmost.11 Churchland’s point, clearly, is that (from a naturalistic perspective) what evolution guarantees is (at most) that we behave in certain ways—in such ways as to promote survival, or more exactly reproductive success. The principal function or purpose, then, (the “chore” says Churchland) of our cognitive faculties is not that of producing true or verisimilitudinous (nearly true) beliefs, but instead that of contributing to survival by getting the body parts in the right place. What evolution underwrites is only (at most) that our behavior is reasonably adaptive to the circumstances in which our ancestors found themselves; hence it does not guarantee mostly true or verisimilitudinous beliefs. Our beliefs might be mostly true or verisimilitudinous (hereafter I’ll omit the “versimilitudinous”); but there is no particular reason to think they would be: natural selection is interested, not in truth, but in appropriate behavior. What Churchland therefore suggests is that naturalistic evolution—that is, the conjunction of metaphysical naturalism with the view that we and our cognitive faculties have arisen by way of the mechanisms and processes proposed by contemporary evolutionary theory—gives us reason to doubt two things: (a) that a purpose of our cognitive systems is that of serving us with true beliefs, and (b) that they do, in fact, furnish us with mostly true beliefs. Indeed, Darwin himself expresses serious doubts along these lines: “With me the horrid doubt always arises whether the convictions of man’s mind, which has been developed from the mind of the lower animals, are of any value or at all trustworthy. Would any one trust in the convictions of a monkey’s mind, if there are any convictions in such a mind?”12

Faith controls the internal link to reason since the validity of reason can only be taken on faith. **CHESTERTON[[28]](#footnote-28):** It is idle to talk always of the alternative of reason and faith. Reason is itself a matter of faith. It is an act of faith to assert that our thoughts have any relation to reality at all. If you are merely a skeptic, you must sooner or later ask yourself the question, "Why should *anything* go right; even observation and deduction? Why should not good logic be as misleading as bad logic? They are both movements in the brain of a bewildered ape?" The young skeptic says, "I have a right to think for myself." But the old skeptic, the complete skeptic, says, "I have no right to think for myself. I have no right to think at all."

Impartiality/supervenience requirements of moral claims are more consistent with theistic intervention, meaning I control the internal link to the NC framework. **MURPHY[[29]](#footnote-29):** Consider first the *normativity* of morals. Both theists and nontheists have been impressed by the weirdness of normativity [means], with its very otherness, and have thought that whatever we say about normativity, it will have to be a story not about natural properties but non-natural ones (cf. Moore 1903, section 13). John Mackie, an atheist, and George Mavrodes, a theist, have both drawn from this the same moral: if there is a God, then the normativity of morality can be understood in theistic terms; otherwise, the normativity of morality is unintelligible (Mavrodes 1986; Mackie 1977, p. 48). As Robert Adams has suggested, given the serious difficulties present in understanding moral properties as natural properties, it is worthwhile taking seriously the hypothesis that morality is not just a nonnatural matter but a supernatural one (Adams 1973, p. 105). For the standard objections against understanding normativity as a nonnatural property concern our inability to say anything further about that non-natural property itself and about our ability to grasp that property (see, e.g., M. Smith 1994, pp. 21–25). But if morality is to be understood in terms of God's commands, we can give an informative account of what these unusual properties are; and if it is understood in terms of God's commands, then we can give an informative account of how God, being the creator and sustainer of us rational beings, can ensure that we can have an adequate epistemic grasp of the moral domain (Adams 1979a, pp. 137–138). Consider next the *impartiality* of morals. The domain of the moral, unlike the domain of value generally, is governed by the requirements of impartiality. To use Sidgwick's phrase, the point of view of morality is not one's personal point of view but rather “the point of view … of the Universe” (Sidgwick 1907, p. 382). But, to remark on the perfectly obvious, the Universe does not have a point of view. Various writers have employed fictions to try to provide some sense to this idea: Adam Smith's impartial and benevolent spectator, Firth's ideal observer, and Rawls' contractors who see the world *sub specie aeternitatis* come to mind most immediately (Smith 1759, Pt III, Ch 8; Firth 1958; and Rawls 1971, p. 587). But theological voluntarism can provide a straightforward understanding of the impartiality of morals by appealing to the claim that the demands of morality arise[s] from the demands of someone who [is] in fact has an impartial and supremely deep love for all [moral agents] of the beings that are morality's proper objects. Consider next the *overridingness* of morals. [SECOND] The domain of the moral, it is commonly thought, consists in a range of values that can demand[s] absolute allegiance, in the sense that it is never reasonable to act contrary to what those values finally require. One deep difficulty with this view, formulated in a number of ways but perhaps most memorably by Sidgwick (1907, pp. 497–509), is that it is hard to see how moral value automatically trumps other kinds of value (e.g. prudential value) when they conflict. But if the domain of the moral is to be understood [as] in terms of the will of a being who can make it possible that, or even ensure that, the balance of reasons is always in favor of acting in accordance with the moral[ly] demand, then the overridingness of morals becomes far easier to explain. Consider next the *content* of morals. There is a strong case to be made that moral judgments cannot have just any content: they must be concerned, somehow, with what exhibits respect for certain beings, or with what promotes their interests (cf. Foot 1958, pp. 510–512; M. Smith 1994, p. 40). Theological voluntarism has a[n] ready explanation for the content of morals being what it is: it is that moral demands arise from a being that loves that being's creation.

It follows that individual persons are God’s possessions and only God has the right to interfere with or destroy them – persons cannot violate each other since that would be usurping the role of God. **TUCKNESS:**[[30]](#footnote-30)Locke believed that makers have property rights with respect to what they make just as God has property rights with respect to human[s] beings because he is their maker. Human[s] beings are created in the image of God and share with God, though to a much lesser extent, the ability to shape and mold the physical environment in accordance with a rational pattern or plan. Waldron has criticized this interpretation on the grounds that it would make the rights of human makers absolute in the same way that God's right over his creation is absolute. Sreenivasan has defended Tully's argument against Waldron's response by claiming a distinction between creating and making. Only creating generates an absolute property right, and only God can create, but making is analogous to creating and creates an analogous, though weaker, right.

**LOCKE**[[31]](#footnote-31)explains original acquisition. Though the earth and all inferior creatures be common to all men, yet every man has a “property” in his own “person.” This nobody has any right to but himself. The “labour” of [their] body and the “work” of [their] hands, we may say, are properly [theirs]. Whatsoever, then, [they] removes out of the state that Nature hath provided and left it in, [they] hath mixed his labour with it, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property. It being by him removed from the common state Nature placed it in, it hath by this labour something annexed to it that excludes the common right of other men. For this “labour” being the unquestionable property of the laborer, no man but he can have a right to what that is once joined to, at least where there is enough, and as good left in common for others. 27. He that is nourished by the acorns he picked up under an oak, or the apples he gathered from the trees in the wood, has certainly appropriated them to himself. Nobody can deny but the nourishment is his. I ask, then, when did they begin to be his? when he digested? or when he ate? or when he boiled? or when he brought them home? or when he picked them up? And it is plain, if the first gathering made them not his, nothing else could. That labour put a distinction between them and common. That added something to them more than Nature, the common mother of all, had done, and so they became his private right. And will any one say he had no right to those acorns or apples he thus appropriated because he had not the consent of all mankind to make them his? Was it a robbery thus to assume to himself what belonged to all in common? If such a consent as that was necessary, [hu]man[s] had starved, notwithstanding the plenty God had given him. We see in commons, which remain so by compact, that it is the taking any part of what is common, and removing it out of the state Nature leaves it in, which begins the property, without which the common is of no use. And the taking of this or that part does not depend on the express consent of all the commoners. Thus, the grass my horse has bit, the turfs my servant has cut, and the ore I have dug in any place, where I have a right to them in common with others, become my property without the assignation or consent of anybody. The labour that was mine, removing them out of that common state they were in, hath fixed my property in them.

Preempts tomato soup objection – one must cultivate something new in adding to nature’s store, not just move unchanged objects. Also an independent contention level argument since letting organs go to waste would be the exact logic that would prevent us from acquiring any property in the first place since we would not be able to use freely usable things. The state relationship to people through society is categorically different than other relationships. The state uses coercive authority to fulfill its purposes and thus it needs more than justifying its action but also demonstrating it is legitimate in being such a coercive agent in the first place.

fwk is means based:

The framework is means based since:

a) greatness of the GCB is such that it is always preferable when it acts then when we act. When we make ourselves less, we enable it to act more on our behalf. We can always trust the GCB to know what to do since it knows everything but your card authors do not.

b) In embracing a position of weakness, we turn back to GCB and allow his power upon us. A state of humility about the consequences we can affect forces us to rely on the GCB, who is perfect in action and power, which prevents us from becoming arrogant and foolish

c) any result permitted by the GCB would be at least morally neutral since they would allow it, which means if I win my internal link you have no offense under your framework and you default aff.

d) empirical arguments about how we reason are not responsive since it would still imply, given God’s omnipotent power, that we were made for that purpose.

Also any risk of infinite consequences after death comes before any earthly bad consequences. Pascal’s Wager means err aff. **PASCAL[[32]](#footnote-32):** —Yes; but you must wager. It is not optional. You are embarked. Which will you choose then; Let us see. Since you must choose, let us see which interests you least. You have two things to lose, the true and the good; and two things to stake, your reason and your will, your knowledge and your happiness; and your nature has two things to shun error and misery. Your reason is no more shocked in choosing one rather than the other, since you must of necessity choose. This is one point settled. But your happiness? Let us weigh the gain and the loss in wagering that God is. Let us estimate these two chances. If you gain, you gain all; if you lose, you lose nothing. Wager them without hesitation that He is. "That is very fine. Yes, I must wager; but I may perhaps wager too much."—Let us see. Since there is an equal risk of gain and of loss, if you had only to gain two lives, instead of one, you might still wager. But if there were three lives to gain, you would have to play (since you are under the necessity of playing), and you would be imprudent, when you are forced to play, not to chance your life to gain three at a game where there is an equal risk of loss and gain. But there is an eternity of life and happiness. And this being so, if there were an infinity of chances, of which one only would be for you, you would still be right in wagering one to win two, and you would act stupidly, being obliged to play, by refusing to stake one life against three at a game in which out of an infinity of chances there is one for you, if there were an infinity of an infinitely happy life to gain. But there is here an infinity of an in finitely happy life to gain, a chance of gain against a finite number of chances of loss, and what you stake is finite. It is all divided; wherever the infinite is and there is not an infinity of chances of loss against that of gain, there is no time to hesitate, you must give all. And thus, when one is forced to play, he must renounce reason to preserve his life, rather than risk it for infinite gain, as likely to happen as the loss of nothingness.

at religious hijacks of the standard:

**Sharpshooter fallacy –** JUST because some things the [Bible and Quran] say are correct or came true, it doesn’t mean that’s unusual given the volume of things that [those books] claim. They say a great many things – it’s inevitable that some might turn out right. if I was in a sharpshooting contest but fired 10,000 rounds some will be on target.

Prefer natural religion based on the form of the GCB to revealed religion based on scripture:

1. You can’t have revealed religion absent the constraints of a full natural religious theory since we would need to know how to interpret the revelation – under what circumstances it could occur, who could receive it, what can the message mean, whether you can trust the revelation etc.

2. Natural religion frames the notion of the revelation as true. That’s something is accurate doesn’t mean its divine. You need to endorse natural religion as good before you can trust the revelation as God’s. Sartre[[33]](#footnote-33): “If an angel appears to me, what is the proof that it is an angel; or, if I hear voices, who can prove that they proceed from heaven and not from hell, or from my own subconscious or some pathological condition? Who can prove that they are really addressed to me? Who, then, can prove that I am the proper person to impose, by my own choice, my conception of man upon mankind? I shall never find any proof whatever; there will be no sign to convince me of it. If a voice speaks to me, it is still I myself who must decide whether the voice is or is not that of an angel. If I regard a certain course of action as good, it is only I who choose to say that it is good and not bad.”

3. Only NR is universally accessible. I could reveal one thing to you and another to someone else or there could be many personal revelations from God that create exceptions and individual mandates; so we cannot treat scripture as exclusively or always true. But the principles behind natural religion are founded in reason, so it always comes first.

4. Most revealed religion endorses natural religion and so revealed religion tends to appeal to it, while natural religion does not appeal to revealed religion so it’s more likely to be accurate.

5. Religious pluralism – massive disagreement about religion implies neither side might be completely true but natural religion is not contested as much since it’s based on the teleology of God instead of specific mandates – o/w on probability.

1ar christianity:

They’ve proven we can’t look to natural religion, so the only option is revealed religion. 1) There were 11 prophecies made before Christ about FUTURE historical events surrounding holy locations in the Christian Bible that ALL had every component come true. **STONER AND NEWMAN**[[34]](#footnote-34)**:** Listing the prophecies which we have considered and the probabilities of their fulfillment, we have: Tyre 1 in 7.5 x 107  Samaria 1 in 4 x 104  Gaza and Ashkelon 1 in 1.2 x 104  Jericho 1 in 2 x 105  The Golden Gate 1 in 103  Zion Plowed 1 in 102  Jerusalem Enlarged 1 in 8 x 1010  Palestine 1 in 2 x 105  Moab and Ammon 1 in 103  Edom 1 in 104  Babylon 1 in 5 x 109 The probability of these eleven prophecies coming true, if written in human wisdom, is now found by multiplying all of these probabilities together, and the result is 1 in 5.76 x 1059 Some will say that the estimates given in some of these prophecies are too large and should be reduced. Other may say [or] that some of the prophecies are related and should have smaller estimates. That may be true, so I would suggest that such a person go back over the prophecies and make his own estimates. They will be found to be still large enough to be conclusive. She may add to the consideration other prophecies and estimate their probability of fulfillment. Use, for example, such prophecies as those referring to the city of Sidon (Ezek. 28:20-23); Capernaum and Bethsaida (Luke 10:13,15); the highway between Egypt and Assyria (Isa. 19:23-25); changes in Egypt (Ezek. 29:12-15; 30:13). I am sure there are more than enough fulfilled prophecies to establish the probability number given above even when the estimates are taken from the most conservative critic. Others may say that these accounts in the Bible are not prophecies, but historical accounts written after the events happened. This is absurd, for all of these prophecies are found in the Old Testament, and every one dates its writing long before Christ. One of these prophecies was completely fulfilled before Christ. Two had small parts fulfilled before Christ, and the remaining parts after Christ. All other[s] prophecies considered were completely fulfilled after Christ. If we were to strike out [those 3] all estimates given for parts of prophecies fulfilled before Christ our probability number would still be so large that the strength of its argument could not be comprehended.

2) Eight notable prophecies were made about a “Messiah” and Christ fulfilled ALL of them. The chances of any one man doing so are really, really low even with the authors’ conservative estimates; there were possibly over 300 total prophecies not even accounted for. **STONER AND NEWMAN (2):** If these estimates are considered fair, one man in how many men, the world over, will fulfill all eight prophecies? This question can be answered by applying our principles of probability. In other words, by multiplying all of our estimates together, or 1 in 2.8 x 105 x 103 x 102 x 103 x 105 x 103 x 104. This gives 1 in 2.8 x 1028, where 28 means that we have 28 ciphers following the 2.8. Let us simplify and reduce the number by calling it 1 in 1028. Written out this number is 1 in 10,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000. This is the answer to the question: One man in how many men has fulfilled these eight prophecies? But we are really concerned with the answer to the question: What is the chance that any man might have lived from the day of these prophecies down to the present time and have fulfilled all of the eight prophecies? We can answer this question by dividing our 1028 by the total number of people who have lived since the time of these prophecies. The best information available indicates the number to be about 88 billion or 8.8 x 1010. To simplify the computation let us call the number 1011. By dividing these two numbers we find that the chance that any man might have lived down to the present time and fulfilled all eight prophecies is 1 in 1017. *Editor's note: It is probable that 88 billion or 8.8 x 1010 assumes a growth rate for the earth's population which is much too small - that most of the people who have ever lived are still alive today - suggesting that this number may be too large by a factor of ten. If so, this will affect the final result by the same factor of ten; ten times fewer total people who might have fulfilled these prophecies means only one tenth the chance that one of them might have done it by accident. Our number would become 1018 instead of 1017. The number used in this book is very conservative.* Let us try to visualize this chance. If you mark one of ten tickets, and place all of the tickets in a hat, and thoroughly stir them, and then ask a blindfolded man to draw one, his chance of getting the right ticket is one in ten. Suppose that we take 1017 silver dollars and lay them on the face of Texas. They will cover all of the state two feet deep. Now mark one of these silver dollars and stir the whole mass thoroughly, all over the state. Blindfold a man and tell him that he can travel as far as he wishes, but he must pick up one silver dollar and say that this is the right one. What chance would he have of getting the right one? Just the same chance that the prophets would have had of writing these eight prophecies and having them all come true in any one man, from their day to the present time, providing they wrote using their own wisdom.

AT problem of evil:

1. Humans lack the epistemic vantage point to make this argument. God could have reasons for allowing evil that we don’t see. **KELLER[[35]](#footnote-35):**, This reasoning is, of course, fallacious. Just because you can’t see or imagine a good reason why God might allow something to happen doesn’t mean there can’t be one. Again we see lurking within supposedly hard-nosed skepticism an enormous faith in one’s own cognitive faculties. If our minds can’t plumb the depths of the universe for good answers to suffering, well, then, there can’t be any! This is blind faith of a high order. The fallacy at the heart of this argument has been illustrated by the “no-see-ums” illustration of Alvin Plantinga. If you look into your pup tent for a St. Bernard, and you don’t see one, it is reasonable to assume that there is no St. Bernard in your tent. But if you look into your pup tent for a “no-see-um” (an extremely small insect with a bite out of all proportion to its size) and you don’t see any, it is not reasonable to assume they aren’t there. Because, after all, no one can see ’em. Many assume that if there were good reasons for the existence of evil, they would be accessible to our minds, more like St. Bernards than like no-see-ums, but why should that be the case?5 This argument against God doesn’t hold up, not only to logic but also to experience. As a pastor, I’ve often preached on the story of Joseph in Genesis. Joseph was an arrogant young man who was hated by his brothers. In their anger at him, they imprisoned him in a pit and then sold him into a life of slavery and misery in Egypt. Doubtless Joseph prayed to God to help him escape, but no help was forthcoming, and into slavery he went. Though he experienced years of bondage and misery, Joseph’s character was refined and strengthened by his trials. Eventually he rose up to become a prime minister of Egypt who saved thousands of lives and even his own family from starvation. If God had not allowed Joseph’s years of suffering, he never would have been such a powerful agent for social justice and spiritual healing. Whenever I preach on this text, I hear from many people who identify with that narrative. Many people have to admit that most of what they really needed for success in life came to them through their most difficult and painful experiences. Some look back on an illness and recognize that it was an irreplaceable season of personal and spiritual growth for them. I have survived a bout with cancer and my wife has suffered with Crohn’s disease for years, and we would both attest to this. I knew a man in my first parish who had lost most of his eyesight after he was shot in the face during a drug deal gone bad. He told me that he had been an extremely selfish and cruel person, but he had always blamed his constant legal and relational problems on others. The loss of his sight had devastated him, but it had also profoundly humbled him. “As my physical eyes were closed, my spiritual eyes were opened, as it were. I finally saw how I’d been treating people. I changed, and now for the first time in my life I have friends, real friends. It was a terrible price to pay, and yet I must say it was worth it. I finally have what makes life worthwhile.” Though none of these people are grateful for the tragedies themselves, they would not trade the insight, character, and strength they had gotten from them for anything. With time and perspective most of us can see good reasons for at least some of the tragedy and pain that occurs in life. Why couldn’t it be possible that, from God’s vantage point, there are good reasons for all of them? If you have a God great and transcendent enough to be mad at because he hasn’t stopped evil and suffering in the world, then you have (at the same moment) a God great and transcendent enough to have good reasons for allowing it to continue that you can’t know. Indeed, you can’t have it both ways.

2. the GCB looks at things from the eternal perspective we cannot occupy and thus can see the eternal good that can come from a seemingly maximal temporal evil. This is a paradox in form. If the GCB is supreme, then it must control ethics and therefore anything it permits is moral or right. God cannot permit evil because it is the source of what good and evil actually mean.

3. The GCB could use evil and suffering in the world to bring us to freely align ourselves with love for him and develop our eternal moral character.

guise of the good expansion:

And, the GCB is the source of ALL which is good since evil cannot exist in itself. **SAINT AUGUSTINE**[[36]](#footnote-36)**:** And in the universe, even that which is called evil, when it is regulated and put in its own place, only enhances our admiration of the good; for we enjoy and value the good more when we compare it with the evil. For the Almighty God, who, as even the heathen acknowledge, has supreme power over all things, being Himself supremely good, would never permit the existence of anything evil among His works, if He were not so omnipotent and good that He can bring good even out of evil. For what is that which we call evil but the absence of good? In the bodies of animals, disease and wounds mean[s] nothing but the absence of health; for when a cure is effected, that does not mean that the evils which were present—namely, the diseases and wounds—go away from the body and dwell elsewhere: they altogether cease to exist; for the wound or disease is not a substance, but a defect in the fleshly substance,—the flesh itself being a substance, and therefore something good, of which those evils—that is, privations of the good which we call health—are accidents. Just in the same way, what are called vices in the soul are nothing but privations of natural good. And when they are cured, they are not transferred elsewhere: when they cease to exist in the healthy soul, they cannot exist anywhere else.

This is an independent divine command warrant since it proves that the GCB created and controls all that is good. [Also takes out your problem of evil arguments since it proves God is not responsible for evil since evil doesn’t actually exist.

*Three more warrants for goodness being original:*

1. Guise of the good: Humans always act towards what they hold to be good. But its impossible to act towards and absence of something, we must be acting towards something positive. Thus, good must be positive to be consistent with an adequate theory of action. **C.S. LEWIS:** Mere Christianity, 1943 The same point can be made in a different way. If Dualism is true, then the bad Power must be a being who likes badness for its own sake. But in reality we have no experience of anyone liking badness just because it is bad. The nearest we can get to it is in cruelty. But in real life people are cruel for one of two reasons- either because they are sadists, that is, because they have a sexual perversion which makes cruelty a cause of sensual pleasure to them, or else for the sake of something they are going to get out of it-money, or power, or safety. But pleasure, money, power, and safety are all, as far as they go, good things. The badness consists in pursuing them by the wrong method, or in the wrong way, or too much. I do not mean, of course, that the people who do this are not desperately wicked. I do mean that wickedness, when you examine it, turns out to be the pursuit of some good in the wrong way. You can be good for the mere sake of goodness: you cannot be bad for the mere sake of badness. You can do a kind action when you are not feeling kind and when it gives you no pleasure, simply because kindness is right; but no one ever did a cruel action simply because cruelty is wrong - only because cruelty was pleasant or useful to him. In other words badness cannot succeed even in being bad in the same way in which goodness is good. Goodness is, so to speak, itself: badness is only spoiled goodness. And there must be something good first before it can be spoiled. We called sadism a sexual perversion; but you must first have the idea of a normal sexuality before you can talk of its being perverted; and you can see which is the perversion, because you can explain the perverted from the normal, and cannot explain the normal from the perverted. It follows that this Bad Power, who is supposed to be on an equal footing with the Good Power, and to love badness in the same way as the Good Power loves goodness, is a mere bogy. In order to be bad he must have good things to want and then to pursue in the wrong way: he must have impulses which were originally good in order to be able to pervert them. But if he is bad he cannot supply himself either with good things to desire or with good impulses to pervert. He must be getting both from the Good Power. And if so, then he is not independent. He is part of the Good Power's world: he was made either by the Good Power or by some power above them both.

2. If that were true we would have no reason to call the perversion good. It’s the metaphysical priority that makes goodness good. **LEWIS (2):** The moral difficulty is that Dualism gives evil a positive, substantive, self-consistent nature, like that of good. If this were true, if Ahriman existed in his own right no less than Ormuzd, what could we mean by calling Ormuzd good except that we happened to prefer him. In what sense can the one party be said to be right and the other wrong? If evil has the same kind of reality as good, the same autonomy and completeness, our allegiance to good becomes the arbitrarily chosen loyalty of a partisan. A sound theory of value demands something different. It demands that good should be original and evil a mere perversion; that good should be the tree and evil the ivy; that good should be able to see all round evil (as when sane men understand lunacy) while evil cannot retaliate in kind; that good should be able to exist on its own while evil requires the good on which it is parasitic in order to continue its parasitic existence.

3. Certain positive things like existence are goods, thus goodness must be original. **LEWIS (3):**Put it more simply still. To be bad, [t]he[y] must exist and have intelligence and will. But existence, intelligence and will are in themselves good. Therefore he must be getting them from the Good Power: even to be bad he must borrow or steal from his opponent. And do you now begin to see why Christianity has always said that the devil is a fallen angel? That is not a mere story for the children. It is a real recognition of the fact that evil is a parasite, not an original thing. The powers which enable evil to carry on are powers given it by goodness. All the things which enable a bad man to be effectively bad are in themselves good things-resolution, cleverness, good looks, existence itself. That is why Dualism, in a strict sense, will not work.

some dct frontlines:

**AT deism:**

There are only two possibilities for the creation of the world: either the GCB created the world for his own sake, in which case he wouldn’t be omnipotent because it would seem to suggest that he *needs* something from the world; or God created the world for *our* sake. This means deistic objections to the standard don’t make sense—if God created the world for our sake he can’t just stop caring about it because that would indicate a shift in his intentions; which would mean he is not omnipotent.

**AT Who caused GCB?**

The point is that the GCB by definition is uncaused. Everything imperfect and finite needs a cause, but not the GCB. If something causes the GCB, that entity is actually the GCB. Proving there must, however, be something at the end of the link is sufficient to prove something called the GCB must exist uncaused.

intelligent design arg:

This implies an external God to intelligently design our universe. **ROSS**[[37]](#footnote-37)**:** One example of fine tuning is the rate at which the universe expands. This value must be delicately balanced to a precision of one part in 1055. If the universe expanded too quickly, matter would expand too quickly for the formation of stars, planets and galaxies. If the universe expanded too slowly, the universe would quickly collapse before the formation of stars.Besides that, the ratio of the electromagnetic force to gravity must be finely balanced to a degree of one part in 1040. If this value were to be increased slightly, all stars would be at least 40% more massive than our sun. This would mean that stellar burning would be too brief and too uneven to support complex life. If this value were to be decreased slightly, all stars would be at least 20% less massive than the sun. This would render them incapable of producing heavy elements necessary to sustain life.

anthro impact turns:

If GCB has chosen to relate to us in a unique fashion, then anthropocentricism is justified since we are separate from all of creation. The relationship between a higher and lower party requires the higher one to reach out in the same way that a relationship with a dog requires us to do the work to make the relationship meaningful; us to care for the dog and train it. The question is whether God has reached out to humanity in the eternal relationship – two warrants:

a) when a cat lounges out it looks fully satisfied but only humans are self-aware that they are in the wrong place and alignment with the GCB is their destination – empirically proven by things like human suicide which no other animal willfully carries out. **CHESTERON**[[38]](#footnote-38)**:** And then followed an experience impossible to describe. It was as if I had been blundering about since my birth with two huge and unmanageable machines, of different shapes and without apparent connection—the world and the Christian tradition. I had found this hole in the world: the fact that one must somehow find a way of loving the world without trusting it; somehow one must love the world without being worldly. I found this projecting feature of Christian theology, like a sort of hard spike, the dogmatic insistence that G[CB] was personal, and had made a world separate from Himself. The spike of dogma fitted exactly into the hole in the world—it had evidently been meant to go there— and then the strange thing began to happen. When once these two parts of the two machines had come together, one after another, all the other parts fitted and fell in with an eerie exactitude. I could hear bolt after bolt over all the machinery falling into its place with a kind of click of relief. Having got one part right, all the other parts were repeating that rectitude, as clock after clock strikes noon. Instinct after instinct was answered by doctrine after doctrine. Or, to vary the metaphor, I was like one who had advanced into a hostile country to take one high fortress. And when that fort had fallen the whole country surrendered and turned solid behind me. The whole land was lit up, as it were, back to the first fields of my childhood. All those blind fancies of boyhood which in the fourth chapter I have tried in vain to trace on the darkness, became suddenly transparent and sane. I was right when I felt that roses were red by some sort of choice: it was the divine choice. I was right when I felt that I would almost rather say that grass was the wrong color than say it must by necessity have been that color: it might verily have been any other. My sense that happiness hung on the crazy thread of a condition did mean something when all was said: it meant the whole doctrine of the Fall. Even those dim and shapeless monsters of notions which I have not been able to describe, much less defend, stepped quietly into their places like colossal caryatides of the creed. The fancy that the cosmos was not vast and void, but small and cozy, had a fulfilled significance now, for anything that is a work of art must be small in the sight of the artist; to God the stars might be only small and dear, like diamonds. And my haunting instinct that somehow good was not merely a tool to be used, but a relic to be guarded, like the goods from Crusoe's ship— even that had been the wild whisper of something originally wise, for, according to Christianity, we were indeed the survivors of a wreck, the crew of a golden ship that had gone down before the beginning of the world. But the important matter was this, that it entirely reversed the reason for optimism. And the instant the reversal was made it felt like the abrupt ease when a bone is put back in the socket. I had often called myself an optimist, to avoid the too evident blasphemy of pessimism. But all the optimism of the age had been false and disheartening for this reason, that it had always been trying to prove that we fit in to the world. The Christian optimism is based on the fact that we do NOT fit in to the world. I had tried to be happy by telling myself that man is an animal, like any other which sought its meat from God. But now I really was happy, for I had learnt that man is a monstrosity. I had been right in feeling all things as odd, for I myself was at once worse and better than all things. The optimist's pleasure was prosaic, for it dwelt on the naturalness of everything; the Christian pleasure was poetic, for it dwelt on the unnaturalness of everything in the light of the supernatural. The modern philosopher had told me again and again that I was in the right place, and I had still felt depressed even in acquiescence. But I had heard that I was in the WRONG place, and my soul sang for joy, like a bird in spring. The knowledge found out and illuminated forgotten chambers in the dark house of infancy. I knew now why grass had always seemed to me as queer as the green beard of a giant, and why I could feel homesick at home.

b) Other empirical evidence would be the universal existence of religious tradition for humans

and not in other animals since it proves that we were granted some interest or capacity to enter a relationship with the spiritual, which no other animal has a trace of.

Even if it is true that they are equal, we have specific obligations. God equipped us with the tools to accomplish our purposes without the assistance or consultation with animals. I would train my batter to be able to bat without having to ask the advice of the picture. It’s absurd to ask those who are fulfilling different functions how to perform your own.

God made things to eat other things and it would be weird to create something that can only survive by being unethical, so animals probably lack some status. A wolf simply cannot survive unless it eats other animals.

derivation of the state:

Enforcement indeterminacy means it’s is impossible to resolve application of the natural law absent the state. **LOCKE[[39]](#footnote-39):** Sect. 7. And that all men may be restrained from invading others rights, and from doing hurt to one another, and the law of nature be observed, which willeth the peace and preservation of all mankind, the execution of the law of nature is, in that state, put into every man [one]'s hands, whereby every one has a right to punish the transgressors of that law to such a degree, as may hinder its violation: for the law of nature would, as all other laws that concern men in this world 'be in vain, if there were no body that in the state of nature had a power to execute that law, and thereby preserve the innocent and restrain offenders. And if any one in the state of nature may punish another for any evil he has done, every one may do so: for in that state of perfect equality, where naturally there is no superiority or jurisdiction of one over another, what any may do in prosecution of that law, every one must needs have a right to do. Sect. 8. And thus, in the state of nature, one man comes by a power over another; but yet no absolute or arbitrary power, to use a criminal, when he has got him in his hands, according to the passionate heats, or boundless extravagancy of his own will; but only to retribute to him, so far as calm reason and conscience dictate, what is proportionate to his transgression, which is so much as may serve for reparation and restraint: for these two are the only reasons, why one man may lawfully do harm to another, which is that we call punishment. In transgressing the law of nature, the offender declares [them]self to live by another rule than that of reason and common equity, which is that measure G[CB] has set to the actions of men, for their mutual security; and so he becomes dangerous to mankind, the tye, which is to secure them from injury and violence, being slighted and broken by him. Which being a trespass against the whole species, and the peace and safety of it, provided for by the law of nature, every man upon this score, by the right he hath to preserve mankind in general, may restrain, or where it is necessary, destroy things noxious to them, and so may bring such evil on any one, who hath transgressed that law, as may make him repent the doing of it, and thereby deter him, and by his example others, from doing the like mischief. And in the case, and upon this ground, EVERY MAN HATH A RIGHT TO PUNISH THE OFFENDER, AND BE EXECUTIONER OF THE LAW OF NATURE. Sect. 9. I doubt not but this will seem a very strange doctrine to some men: but before they condemn it, I desire them to resolve me, by what right any prince or state can put to death, or punish an alien, for any crime he commits in their country. It is certain their laws, by virtue of any sanction they receive from the promulgated will of the legislative, reach not a stranger: they speak not to him, nor, if they did, is he bound to hearken to them. The legislative authority, by which they are in force over the subjects of that commonwealth, hath no power over him. Those who have the supreme power of making laws in England, France or Holland, are to an Indian, but like the rest of the world, men without authority: and therefore, if by the law of nature every man hath not a power to punish offences against it, as he soberly judges the case to require, I see not how the magistrates of any community can punish an alien of another country; since, in reference to him, they can have no more power than what every man naturally may have over another. Sect, 10. Besides the crime which consists in violating the law, and varying from the right rule of reason, whereby a man so far becomes degenerate, and declares himself to quit the principles of human nature, and to be a noxious creature, there is commonly injury done to some person or other, and some other man receives damage by his transgression: in which case he who hath received any damage, has, besides the right of punishment common to him with other men, a particular right to seek reparation from him that has done it: and any other person, who finds it just, may also join with him that is injured, and assist him in recovering from the offender so much as may make satisfaction for the harm he has suffered. Sect. 11. From these two distinct rights, the one of punishing the crime for restraint, and preventing the like offence, which right of punishing is in every body; the other of taking reparation, which belongs only to the injured party, comes it to pass that the magistrate, who by being magistrate hath the common right of punishing put into his hands, can often, where the public good demands not the execution of the law, remit the punishment of criminal offences by his own authority, but yet cannot remit the satisfaction due to any private man for the damage he has received. That, he who has suffered the damage has a right to demand in his own name, and he alone can remit: the damnified person has this power of appropriating to himself the goods or service of the offender, by right of self-preservation, as every man has a power to punish the crime, to prevent its being committed again, by the right he has of preserving all mankind, and doing all reasonable things he can in order to that end: and thus it is, that every man, in the state of nature, has a power to kill a murderer, both to deter others from doing the like injury, which no reparation can compensate, by the example of the punishment that attends it from every body, and also to secure men from the attempts of a criminal, who having renounced reason, the common rule and measure God hath given to mankind, hath, by the unjust violence and slaughter he hath committed upon one, declared war against all mankind, and therefore may be destroyed as a lion or a tyger, one of those wild savage beasts, with whom men can have no society nor security: and upon this is grounded that great law of nature, Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed. And Cain was so fully convinced, that every one had a right to destroy such a criminal, that after the murder of his brother, he cries out, Every one that findeth me, shall slay me; so plain was it writ in the hearts of all mankind. Sect. 12. By the same reason may a man in the state of nature punish the lesser breaches of that law. It will perhaps be demanded, with death? I answer, each transgression may be punished to that degree, and with so much severity, as will suffice to make it an ill bargain to the offender, give him cause to repent, and terrify others from doing the like. Every offence, that can be committed in the state of nature, may in the state of nature be also punished equally, and as far forth as it may, in a commonwealth: for though it would be besides my present purpose, to enter here into the particulars of the law of nature, or its measures of punishment; yet, it is certain there is such a law, and that too, as intelligible and plain to a rational creature, and a studier of that law, as the positive laws of commonwealths; nay, possibly plainer; as much as reason is easier to be understood, than the fancies and intricate contrivances of men, following contrary and hidden interests put into words; for so truly are a great part of the municipal laws of countries, which are only so far right, as they are founded on the law of nature, by which they are to be regulated and interpreted. Sect. 13. To this strange doctrine, viz. That in the state of nature every one has the executive power of the law of nature, I doubt not but it will be objected**,** that it is unreasonable for [people] men to be judges in their own cases, that self-love will make [them] men partial to themselves and their friends: and on the other side, that ill nature, passion and revenge will carry them too far in punishing others; and hence nothing but confusion and disorder will follow, and that therefore God hath certainly appointed government to restrain the partiality and violence of men. I easily grant, that civil government is the proper remedy for **the inconveniencies of** the state of nature, **which must certainly be great, where men may be judges in their own case,** since it is easy to be imagined, that [they] who was so unjust as to do **his brother an** injury, will scarce be so just as to condemn him[them]self for it: but I shall desire those who make this objection, to remember, that absolute monarchs are but men; and if government is to be the remedy of those evils, which necessarily follow from men's being judges in their own cases, and the state of nature is therefore not to be endured, I desire to know what kind of government that is, and how much better it is than the state of nature, where one man, commanding a multitude, has the liberty to be judge in his own case, and may do to all his subjects whatever he pleases, without the least liberty to any one to question or controul those who execute his pleasure? and in whatsoever he doth, whether led by reason, mistake or passion, must be submitted to? much better it is in the state of nature, wherein men are not bound to submit to the unjust will of another: and if he that judges, judges amiss in his own, or any other case, he is answerable for it to the rest of mankind.

Government obligations are explained by **LOCKE[[40]](#footnote-40):** IF [humans] man in the state of Nature be so free as has been said, if he be absolute lord of his own person and possessions, equal to the greatest and subject to nobody, why will he part with his freedom, this empire, and subject himself to the dominion and control of any other power? To which it is obvious to answer, that though in the state of Nature [they] hath such a right, yet the enjoyment of it is very uncertain and constantly exposed to the invasion of others; for all being kings as much as he, every man his equal, and the greater part no strict observers of equity and justice, the enjoyment of the property he has in this state is very unsafe, very insecure. This makes him [them] willing to quit this condition which, however free, is full of fears and continual dangers; and it is not without reason that he seeks out and is willing to join in society with others who are already united, or have a mind to unite for the mutual preservation of their lives, liberties and estates, which I call by the general name - property. § 124. The great and chief end, therefore, of men uniting into commonwealths, and putting themselves under government, is the preservation of their property; to which in the state of Nature there are many things wanting. Firstly, there wants an established, settled, known law, received and allowed by common consent to be the standard of right and wrong, and the common measure to decide all controversies between them. For though the law of Nature be plain and intelligible to all rational creatures, yet men, being biased by their interest, as well as ignorant for want of study of it, are not apt to allow of it as a law binding to them in the application of it to their particular cases. § 125. Secondly, in the state of Nature there wants a known and indifferent judge, with authority to determine all differences according to the established law. For every one in that state being both judge and executioner of the law of Nature, men being partial to themselves, passion and revenge is very apt to carry them too far, and with too much heat in their own cases, as well as negligence and unconcernedness, make them too remiss in other men's. § 126. Thirdly, in the state of Nature there often wants power to back and support the sentence when right, and to give it due execution. They who by any injustice offended will seldom fail where they are able by force to make good their injustice. Such resistance many times makes the punishment dangerous, and frequently destructive to those who attempt it. § 127. Thus mankind, notwithstanding all the privileges of the state of Nature, being but in an ill condition while they remain in it are quickly driven into society. Hence it comes to pass, that we seldom find any number of men live any time together in this state. The inconveniencies that they are therein exposed to by the irregular and uncertain exercise of the power every man has of punishing the transgressions of others, make them take sanctuary under the established laws of government, and therein seek the preservation of their property. It is this that makes them so willingly give up every one his single power of punishing to be exercised by such alone as shall be appointed to it amongst them, and by such rules as the community, or those authorised by them to that purpose, shall agree on. And in this we have the original right and rise of both the legislative and executive power as well as of the governments and societies themselves. § 128. For in the state of Nature to omit the liberty he has of innocent delights, a man [humans have] has two powers. The first is to do whatsoever [s]he thinks fit for the preservation of himself and others within the permission of the law of Nature; by which law, common to them all, he and all the rest of mankind are one community, make up one society distinct from all other creatures, and were it not for the corruption and viciousness of degenerate men, there would be no need of any other, no necessity that men should separate from this great and natural community, and associate into lesser combinations. The other power a man has in the state of Nature is the power [and] to punish the crimes committed against that law. Both these [powers] [s]he gives up when [s]he joins in a private, if I may so call it, or particular political society, and incorporates into any commonwealth separate from the rest of mankind. § 129. The first power - viz., of doing whatsoever he thought fit for the preservation of himself and the rest of mankind, he gives up to be regulated by laws made by the society, so far forth as the preservation of himself and the rest of that society shall require; which laws of the society in many things confine the liberty he had by the law of Nature. § 130. Secondly, the power of punishing he wholly gives up, and engages his natural force, which he might before employ in the execution of the law of Nature, by his own single authority, as he thought fit, to assist the executive power of the society as the law thereof shall require. For being now in a new state, wherein he is to enjoy many conveniencies from the labour, assistance, and society of others in the same community, as well as protection from its whole strength, he is to part also with as much of his natural liberty, in providing for himself, as the good, prosperity, and safety of the society shall require, which is not only necessary but just, since the other members of the society do the like. § 131. But though men when they enter into society give up the equality, liberty, and executive power they had in the state of Nature into the hands of the society, to be so far disposed of by the legislative as the good of the society shall require, yet it being only with an intention in every one the better to preserve him[them]self, his liberty and property (for no rational creature can be supposed to change [their] his condition with an intention to be worse), the power of the society or legislative constituted by them can never be supposed to extend farther than the common good, but is obliged to secure every one's property by providing against those three defects above mentioned that made the state of Nature so unsafe and uneasy. And so, whoever has the legislative or supreme power of any commonwealth, is bound to govern by established standing laws, promulgated and known to the people, and not by extemporary decrees, by indifferent and upright judges, who are to decide controversies by those laws; and to employ the force of the community at home only in the execution of such laws, or abroad to prevent or redress foreign injuries and secure the community from inroads and invasion. And all this to be directed to no other end but the peace, safety, and public good of the people.

miracles cards - lewis:

The only way to avoid epistemic skep, the sine qua non of all theorizing, is to believe in the existence of a GCB. **LEWIS[[41]](#footnote-41):** It follows that no account of the universe can be true unless that account leaves it possible for our thinking to be a real insight. A theory which explained everything else in the whole universe but which made it impossible to believe that our thinking was valid, would be utterly out of court. For that theory would itself have been reached by thinking, and if thinking is not valid that theory would, of course, be itself demolished. It would have destroyed its own credentials. It would be an argument which proved that no argument was sound—a proof that there are no such things as proofs—which is nonsense. But it can be this only on certain terms. An act of knowing must be determined, in a sense, solely by what is known; we must know it to be thus solely because it is thus. That is what knowing means. You may call this a Cause and Effect because, and call ‘being known’ a mode of causation if you like. But it is a unique mode. The act of knowing has no doubt various conditions, without which it could not occur: attention, and the states of will and health which this presupposes. But its positive character must be determined by the truth it knows. If it were totally explicable from other sources it would cease to be knowledge, just as (to use the sensory parallel) the ringing in my ears ceases to be what we mean by ‘hearing’ if it can be fully explained from causes other than a noise in the outer world— such as, say, the tinnitus produced by a bad cold. If what seems an act of knowledge is partially explicable from other sources, then the knowing (properly so called) in it is just what they leave over, just what demands, for its explanation, the thing known, as real hearing is what is left after you have discounted the tinnitus. Any thing which professes to explain our reasoning fully without introducing an act of knowing thus solely determined by what is known, is really a theory that there is no reasoning. But this, as it seems to me, is what Naturalism is bound to do. It offers what professes to be a full account of our mental behaviour; but this account, on inspection, leaves no room for the acts of knowing or insight on which the whole value of our thinking, as a means to truth, depends. It is agreed on all hands that reason, and even sentience, and life itself are late comers in Nature. If there is nothing but Nature, therefore, reason must have come into existence by a historical process. And of course, for the Naturalist, this process was not designed to produce a mental behaviour that can find truth. There was no Designer; and indeed, until there were thinkers, there was no truth or falsehood. The type of mental behaviour we now call rational thinking or inference must therefore have been ‘evolved’ by natural selection, by the gradual weeding out of types less fitted to survive. Once, then, our thoughts were not rational. That is, all our thoughts once were, as many of our thoughts still are, merely subjective events, not apprehensions of objective truth. Those which had a cause external to ourselves at all were (like our pains) responses to stimuli. Now natural selection could operate only by eliminating responses that were biologically hurtful and multiplying those which tended to survival. But it is not conceivable that any improvement of responses could ever turn them into acts of insight, or even remotely tend to do so. The relation between response and stimulus is utterly different from that between knowledge and the truth known. Our physical vision is a far more useful response to light than that of the cruder organisms which have only a photo-sensitive spot. But neither this improvement nor any possible improvements we can suppose could bring it an inch nearer to being a knowledge of light. It is admittedly something without which we could not have had that knowledge. But the knowledge is achieved by experiments and inferences from them, not by refinement of the response. It is not men with specially good eyes who know about light, but men who have studied the relevant sciences. In the same way our psychological responses to our environment—our curiosities, aversions, delights, expectations—could be indefinitely improved (from the biological point of view) without becoming anything more than responses. Such perfection of the non-rational responses, far from amounting to their conversion into valid inferences, might be conceived as a different method of achieving survival—an alternative to reason. A conditioning which secured that we never felt delight except in the useful nor aversion save from the dangerous, and that the degrees of both were exquisitely proportional to the degree of real utility or danger in the object, might serve us as well as reason or in some circumstances better. But then, equally, no more Naturalism. For of course Naturalism is a prime specimen of that towering speculation, discovered from practice and going far beyond experience, which is now being condemned. Nature is not an object that can be presented either to the senses or the imagination. It can be reached only by the most remote inferences. Or not reached, merely approached. It is the hoped for, the assumed, unification in a single interlocked system of all the things inferred from our scientific experiments. More than that, the Naturalist, not content to assert this, goes on to the sweeping negative assertion. ‘There is nothing except this’—an assertion surely, as remote from practice, experience, and any conceivable verification as has ever been made since men began to use their reason speculatively. Yet on the present view, the very first step into such a use was an abuse, the perversion of a faculty merely practical, and the source of all chimeras. On these terms the Theist’s position must be a chimera nearly as outrageous as the Naturalist’s. (Nearly, not quite; it abstains from the crowning audacity of a huge negative). But the Theist need not, and does not, grant these terms. He is not committed to the view that reason is a comparatively recent development moulded by a process of selection which can select only the biologically useful. For him, reason—the reason of God—is older than Nature, and from it the orderliness of Nature, which alone enables us to know her, is derived. For him, the human mind in the act of knowing is illuminated by the Divine reason. It is set free, in the measure required, from the huge nexus of non-rational causation; free from this to be determined by the truth known. And the preliminary processes within Nature which led up to this liberation, if there were any, were designed to do so. To call the act of knowing—the act, not of remembering that something was so in the past, but of ‘seeing’ that it must be so always and in any possible world—to call this act ‘supernatural’, is some violence to our ordinary linguistic usage. But of course we do not mean by this that it is spooky, or sensational, or even (in any religious sense) ‘spiritual’. We mean only that it ‘won’t fit in’; that such an act, to be what it claims to be—and if it is not, all our thinking is discredited —cannot be merely the exhibition at a particular place and time of that total, and largely mindless, system of events called ‘Nature’. It must break sufficiently free from that universal chain in order to be determined by what it knows. But I am afraid it will not do. It is, of course, possible to suppose that when all the atoms of the universe got into a certain relation (which they were bound to get into sooner or later) they would give rise to a universal consciousness. And it might have thoughts. And it might cause those thoughts to pass through our minds. But unfortunately its own thoughts, on this supposition, would be the product of non-rational causes and therefore, by the rule which we use daily, they would have no validity. This cosmic mind would be, just as much as our own minds, the product of mindless Nature. We have not escaped from the difficulty, we have only put it a stage further back. The cosmic mind will help us only if we put it at the beginning, if we suppose it to be, not the product of the total system, but the basic, original, self-existent Fact which exists in its own right. But to admit that sort of cosmic mind is to admit a God outside Nature, a transcendent and supernatural God. This route, which looked like offering an escape, really leads us round again to the place we started from.

apophatic theology notes:

1. Turn: God’s ideas of good cannot be wholly other from our own. If they were then all the good of our moral admiration becomes meaningless and God is nothing more than a fiendish devil. C.S. Lewis. The Problem of Pain. Harper Collins. 1940. Chapter 3 On the other hand, if God’s moral judgement differs from ours so that our ‘black’ may be His ‘white’, we can mean nothing by calling Him good; for to say ‘God is good’, while asserting that His goodness is wholly other than ours, is really only to say ‘God is we know not what’. And an utterly unknown quality in God cannot give us moral grounds for loving or obeying Him. If He is not (in our sense) ‘good’ we shall obey, if at all, only through fear—and should be equally ready to obey an omnipotent Fiend. The doctrine of Total Depravity—when the consequence is drawn that, since we are totally depraved, our idea of good is worth simply nothing—may thus turn Christianity into a form of devil-worship.

2. To claim we know nothing of God embroils us in endless incoherence as well as losing any capacity to love God. Three reasons. Duns Scotus [Generally considered to be one of the three most important philosopher-theologians of the High Middle Ages, major influence on both Catholic and Secular thought]. From Ordination I, distinction 3, part 1, questions 1—2. Translated by Thomas Williams from the Vatican edition of Ordination I, d.33 pars 1, qq. 1-2. In answering this question one should make no distinction between God’s being known negatively and his being known affirmatively, since a negation is known only in virtue of an affirmation, according to On Interpretation 2, near the end, and Metaphysics 4. It is also evident that we do not know negations about God except through affirmations: on the basis of those affirmations, we negate other things that are incompatible with those affirmations. [Paragraph break] Also we do not have supreme love for negations. [Paragraph break] Similarly, a negation is conceived either in isolation or as said of something. If a negation—say, non-stone—is conceived in isolation, it is just as applicable to nothing as it is to God, since a pure negation is said of being and of non-being. So in such a case God Is no more being understood than is nothing or a chimera. If we are talking about a negation said of something, then I ask about the underlying concept of which this negation is understood to be true: is it an affirmative concept or a negative concept? If it is an affirmative concept, my point is made. If it is a negative concept, I ask as before: is that negation conceived in isolation or as said of something? If in isolation, it is just as applicable to nothing as it is to God; if as said of something, I ask as before. And however far we might keep going with these negations, either God will not be understood any more than nothing is, or we eventually come to a stopping point in some affirmative concept that is first.

3. Apophatic theology links into itself. Stephen Webb [is a theologian and philosopher of religion, PhD from UChicago]. “The End of Negative Theology.” 9/23/2014. The problem is that when theologians try to make negative theology stand on its own, they make fools of us all. To see this point, take Epimenides, the Cretan philosopher who threw a wrench of self-reference into logic with his immortal statement, “All Cretans are liars.” A roughly equivalent statement made by a theologian is that, “All theological statements about God must be negated.” Just as it is impossible to establish if Epimenides spoke the truth about Cretans, it is impossible to accept that our theologian has spoken the truth about God. For our negative theologian not to be a liar, there must be at least one true statement about God, and this is his insistence that all (other) statements about God are not true and thus must be negated. But even if it can be shown that our negative theologian is not a liar, he still makes the faithful look foolish. He leaves us nothing to believe but himself.

On the alt

1. Perm: We should follow Aquinas and place Cataphatic and Apophatic theology as dialectical correctives, thus endorse both positive and negative speaking of God as a way to maintain paradoxical mystery even in our negative theological intuitions. This solves better, because

* 1. It prevents us from foreclosing on the capacity of divine self-revelation which is key claiming we don’t know the extent of God’s capacities.
  2. It acts is a correct to the assumption that we can positively say negative theology is true.
  3. It recognizes the need for positive statements even to have something to say negatively about God. It is uninteresting to say ‘God is not a fish, like we conceive fishes’ even if it is interpreting to say ‘God does not exist, like we conceive of existence.’ Thus it is only in the endorsement of the Cataphatic that the insights of the negative theologian are meaningful.

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